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Preface 
Over the past decade IIASA has sponsored several international conferences on 
long-wave phenomena. The latest of these was a conference on "The Life Cycle 
and the Long Wave," which took place in Montpellier, France, in July 1987. 
This paper was not presented at the conference, but it was (according to the 
author) inspired by it. In any case, if clearly fits into the general scope of the 
Technology, Economy and Society Program at IIASA. 
F. SCHMIDT-BLEEK 
Leader 
Technology, Economy and Society 
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TECHNOLOGICAL 
TRANSFORMATIONS 
AND LONG WAVES 
R. U. A yres 
1. Introduction 
1.1. Background 
The possibility of long cycles in prices and in economic activity of about 50 years 
from peak to peak was noted more than a century ago by W.S. Jevons (Klein- 
knecht, 1987, p. 2). In fact Jevons cited even earlier articles. However, the first 
author to subject the hypothesis of long cycles to systematic analysis was the 
Marxist Dutch economist Van Gelderen (1913), who anticipated much that has 
been rediscovered by others. Among these rediscoverers is the Russian econom- 
ist N.D. Kondratieff (1926, 1928, 1978), whose classic work has resulted in his 
name being permanently associated with the phenomenon. 
Van Gelderen was the first to suggest a plausible causal hypothesis: that a 
long period of rising prices (prosperity) is driven by the rapid growth of one or 
more leading sectors. Van Gelderen also discussed and tried to explain other 
important features of the process, including periodic over and under investment 
of capital, periodic scarcity or abundance of basic resources, and credit expan- 
sion and contraction. 
Joseph Schumpeter's well-known study of business cycles was, in many 
ways, an extension and update of Van Gelderen's ideas (Schumpeter, 1939). He 
proposed that temporal clustering of a number of major technological innova- 
tions during periods of deflation and recession might account for the dramatic 
growth of the so-called leading sectors; in turn the leading sectors seem to drive 
the inflationary half of the cycle. This idea was immediately and sharply chal- 
lenged by Simon Kuznets, who doubted both the existence of Kondratieff cycles 
and the causal explanation suggested by Schumpeter (Kuznets, 1940). However, 
Kuznets seems to have taken the idea more seriously in a later book (1953). 
The subject has been revived yet again in recent years, especially by Ros- 
tow (1975, 1978), Mensch (1975), and Forrester (1976, 1979, 1981). Rostow's 
interest is primarily directed to the phenomenon of takeoff leading to sustained 
long-term economic development. He views Van Gelderen's leading sectors not 
only as the drivers of the long wave, but as the engine of long-term growth for 
the whole economy. Mensch attempted to document the innovation-clustering 
hypothesis and to explain the gaps between clusters by invoking a theory of 
investment behavior, namely, that during periods of general prosperity investors 
will shy away from risky long-term ventures (innovations) whereas during 
periods of stagnation or recession they may be more willing to invest in new ven- 
tures. The latter thesis, in turn, has spawned a new wave of critiques and vari- 
ants, including studies by Mandel (1980); Clark, Freeman, and Soete (1982); 
Freeman (1983); Van Duijn (1983); Mansfield (1983); and Kleinknecht (1981, 
1984, 1987). 
At least one important variant of the Schumpeter-Mensch thesis, associated 
primarily with Freeman and his co-workers, has emerged from this debate. The 
rapid growth period of the long wave is not necessarily driven by innovations 
occurring in the immediately preceding trough. There seem to be other cases in 
which the rapid growth period was driven in some part by the adoption/diffusion 
of important technologies that were tentatively introduced much earlier, but 
which needed a long gestation or were not yet ripe for some reason. This notion 
does not dispute the importance of the basic innovation (or the key facilitating 
inventions preceding it), but it does put major emphasis on the subsequent 
processes of development, improvement, application to new (and sometimes 
unexpected) purposes, and subsequent adoption. In all this there is continuous 
and vital feedback between the innovator and the user, characterized by learning 
on both sides. The technology diffusion process, as this set of interactive 
phenomena is usually called, thus becomes quite central to any complete theory 
of long waves. Key theoretical contributions to the adoption/diffusion literature 
have been made in recent years by Nelson and Winter (1977), Sahal (1981), Dosi 
(1982), and Perez (1983, 1983a). 
1.2. Summary of the argument 
The starting point for this paper is Schumpeter, in the sense that the existence of 
long waves (but not necessarily cycles) in economic activity is taken for granted. 
The objective evidence indicates that since about 1780 there have been several 
extended periods of extraordinary economic growth followed by periods of 
reduced growth punctuated by deep recessions. A rough periodicity of 50 to 55 
years can also be observed, although it varies from country to country. For 
several reasons, the notion of an underlying causal dynamic must remain highly 
speculative. In other words, waves can be seen somewhat clearly, at  least in 
retrospect, but "cyclicity" remains doubtful. 
Schumpeter's suggestion that temporal clustering of major innovations in a 
trough is the primary mover to the next wave is consistent with a growing 
weight of evidence that economic growth is, indeed, driven by technological 
change. But Freeman's variation on this theme is no less consistent and prob- 
ably provides a more powerful explanation. This paper adds nothing to the 
empirical evidence for either waves or clusters, merely noting that the recent 
work of Kleinknecht (1981, 1984, 1987) has strengthened the case for the latter. 
The purpose of this paper is to explore why such clusters occurred when they 
did. It is equally important to test the Freeman thesis, seeking examples and 
explanations of growth driven by belated diffusion. In particular, the question is 
whether innovations are essentially independent events (in which case temporal 
clustering would imply the existence of an underlying causal dynamic) or 
whether clusters occur naturally in connection with mesoscale technological 
transformations - essentially the creation of new industries - because both inno- 
vation and diffusion depend in a fundamental way on prior and concurrent 
developments in other fields. 
The essence of the latter view (which is the one adopted hereafter) is that 
advances in technology, together with an exhaustion of certain natural resources, 
have combined to bring about a series of coordinated technological transforma- 
tions that are correlated with waves of economic activity. These coordinated 
transformations have affected virtually all aspects of economic life. In fact, the 
first and second waves (beginning ca. 1775 and ca. 1825) have commonly been 
combined and called the "first industrial revolution." The third transformation, 
which began around 1870, could very well be called the "second industrial revo- 
lution." A fourth transformation, affecting consumers more than industry, began 
in the late 1930s, was interrupted by World War 11, and continued through the 
1950s. A fifth transformation with some revolutionary implications for both 
industry and consumers seems to have begun in the 1970s. 
The first transformation (177C1800) was accompanied by a shift from 
dependence on charcoal and waterpower to large-scale use of coal for energy. 
This required a quantum increase in goods transportation capability, which was 
initially met by the building of canals to link the major rivers of the UK. The 
completion of the basic links of the canal system around 1790 coincided with the 
economic "takeoff," and canals (primarily for carrying coal) were extremely 
profitable for the next half century. The steam engine gradually made coal- 
based energy available for rotative motion, for a variety of purposes, regardless 
of location. 
During the last two decades of the eighteenth century, a major new textile 
material (cotton) and a new structural material (wrought iron) decreased sharply 
in price and became widely available. The combination of steam engines with 
new iron-working and machine-tool technology made coal-based energy available 
for prime movers. First, stationary engines supplemented, and finally replaced, 
waterpower to drive factory machinery. Later mobile engines supplanted horses 
and the wind. It was the former development that led to the railroads (iron 
horses), beginning around 1830. Widespread application of steam power to 
manufacturing and transportation - diffusion - was the key to the second tech- 
nological transformation. Railways, incidentally, broke the canal's monopoly on 
heavy goods transport in the UK, while steam engines were making river trans- 
port far more practical in the US. The decline in profitability of UK canals led 
to heavy losses in canal share prices (i.e., in nominal wealth) between 1838 and 
1843, while the second and more massive railway construction boom in the mid- 
1840s undoubtedly contributed to the economic recovery that followed. Railway 
building, incidentally, provided the impetus for major expansion in iron produc- 
tion, the adoption of more efficient smelting technology (the hot blast), and the 
search for better ways of making steel (which culminated in the discoveries of 
Henry Bessemer et al. in the 1850s). It also triggered the creation of a telegraph 
network, at  least in the UK. Meanwhile, the availability of an efficient transport 
infrastructure together with an evolving technology of coking, led to the innova- 
tion of the gaslight. The town-gas industry started very slowly, but accelerated 
rapidly in the 1840s and 1950s. 
The third technological transformation (1870-1895) was more complex. It 
centers around the substitution of steel for iron as an engineering material, the 
beginnings of the petroleum and electric-power industries, and the development 
of the internal-combustion engine. Steel, gasoline, and the internal-combustion 
engine made the automobile possible, just as steam power and wrought iron 
combined to facilitate the railroad. New combinations and technological spin- 
offs from these basic changes resulted in the creation of a number of other new 
industries. 
One was a spin-off of the gaslight industry: dyes made from coal tar began 
to replace vegetable dyes for textiles (mainly in Germany). During this period 
the chemical industry expanded rapidly, as growing use of textiles triggered 
greater use of soaps, bleaches, and dyes. Growth of the market for illuminating 
oil created a refining industry and new requirements for basic chemicals, espe- 
cially sulfuric acid and sodium hydroxide. But above all, they permitted an 
enormous increase in manufacturing productivity, especially in the US. Just as 
coal, iron, cotton, and railroads spearheaded the great UK economic expansion 
from 1780 to 1860, the rise of the steel, petroleum, automobile, and electrical 
industries propelled a comparable US expansion from 1880 to 1930 and resumed 
after World War 11. This expansion was clearly related to the diffusion of steel, 
automobiles, telephones, and electrification throughout society. 
The period of greatest gains in prosperity occurred after an initial period of 
heavy investment in technology development and infrastructure buildup. The 
construction of the US railroad system had peaked by 1920. The same is true of 
the urban trolley system (since dismantled) that once connected Maine with 
Wisconsin. The urban road network was still growing, but more slowly. (The 
US government began a major highway-building program in the 1930s as an 
anti-depression measure. An even bigger program was begun in the 1950s.) The 
mining and distribution system of coal and the (coal-based) gas distribution were 
in place by 1920; at this time coal consumption was stable or declining. In fact, 
1910 was the peak year for gas lighting. All cities and towns also had electric 
power generating and distribution systems of electric power and telephone 
exchanges, and many systems were already interconnected by 1920. 
It has been suggested that the synergistic combination of telephone net- 
works and road networks - which facilitated truck transportation - permitted a 
dramatic economic decrease in inventory requirements during the 1920s.[1] At 
any rate, capital productivity rose sharply during that decade, perhaps the most 
dramatic such rise of which we have reliable statistical evidence. 
During the first 50 years of the nineteenth century labor productivity in the 
US rose a mere 0.5% per year. This increased to 1% per year from 1850 to 1890, 
then nearly doubled to 1.9% per year from 1890 to 1900, and continued at  1.8% 
per year through 1929 (Schurr et al., 1983). Yet multifactor productivity grew 
only 0.8% per year from 1899 to 1920, so capital productivity increased very lit- 
tle, if at all, during that period. On the other hand, after 1920 the situation 
reversed: multifactor productivity significantly exceeded labor productivity for a 
time, which implies a sharp increase in the productivity of existing capital 
(Schurr, 1984). It is difficult to avoid concluding that this reflected the end of 
the buildup associated with the third transformation. It also suggests the possi- 
bility that such a synergistic combination of events might occur again, perhaps 
in the relatively near future. 
The last half century shows marked deviations from the earlier pattern in 
several respects. The Great Depression, followed by World War 11, resulted in a 
substantial accumulation of savings and pent-up demand, which propelled a 
renewed postwar period of expansion. It was fed by consumer demand and led, 
to a large extent, by the same group of industries as before (steel, auto, 
petroleum, and electrical). A slowdown in the growth of demand for steel was 
roughly compensated by growing demand for aluminum and plastics, but the 
dominant process, in economic terms, was the further diffusion of technologies 
that were already well established during the previous transformation. To be 
sure, the electrical industry expanded to embrace appliances and "white goods." 
Many new plastics and drugs were introduced. But despite the growing impor- 
tance of a number of peripheral technologies, such as air transportation, consu- 
mer electronics, computers, and pharmaceuticals, as a group they were not 
important enough to take over the role of "locomotiven for the whole world econ- 
omy. The slowdown of the 1970s may have been a case of simultaneous matura- 
tion of a number of the major growth industries of earlier times, most notably 
the automobile industry and its satellites. 
The last decade has witnessed the start of a new and major technological 
transformation, leading (as many have suggested, e.g., Bell, 1976; MacRae, 1984) 
to a "postindustrialn society, in which information and telecommunication ser- 
vices are the primary generator of wealth and engine of growth. The very large 
cumulative investment in computers made over the past 30 years may now be 
starting to pay off in terms of a new jump in capital productivity (Ayres, 1989). 
Once again, synergistic gains arising from the combination of telecommunication 
and computer technologies appear to be on the verge of facilitating sharp 
improvements in the ratio of industrial output to inventory. Significant gains 
have already been recorded in many countries since 1980 (Dimitrov and Wandel, 
1988, figs. 2 and 3). In this case, Japan has led the way by pioneering just-in- 
time manufacturing methods. However, the potential of secalled computer- 
integrated manufacturing (CIM) is far beyond anything seen to date. In fact, the 
goal of many manufacturing firms, once considered visionary, is no less than the 
ability to produce on demand (rather than for inventory) with a turnaround time 
measured in hours or days, rather than weeks or years (Ayres and Miller, 1983, 
chap. 6; Ayres, 1984, chap. 6). This goal is likely to be approached in many 
cases within the next 20 years. 
1.3. Stylized chronology of long waves 
The long (45-60 year) wave was originally observed as an alternating period of 
inflation or rising prices, followed by deflation or falling prices, each lasting 
about 25 years. Of course, price indices in the modern sense cannot be recon- 
structed for the full historical period of interest, except for a relatively few key 
commodities. Figures 1 through 4 show price indices for the UK and the US, 
respectively. For each country two indices are shown. Figures 1 and 2 display 
wholesale prices relative to the 5Cbyear moving average for the UK and the US in 
two versions: unsmoothed and smoothed over an 11-year period. Figures 9 and 
4 display wholesale prices smoothed over a rolling 25-year period, again relative 
to the 5Cbyear moving average. The long wave is most clearly visible in the 
smooth version, of course. Note that there are significant differences between the 
two countries: 
UK 
First Wave A period 1782-1820 
B period 1820-1839 
Second Wave A period 1839-1868 
B period 1868-1894 
Third Wave A period 1894-1920 
B period 1920-1945 
Fourth Wave A period 1945-? 
If the long wave is anything but a statistical coincidence, there should be a 
correlation between rising prices (inflation) and economic growth (prosperity). 
That is to say, basic economic theory suggests that sustained prosperity is likely 
to result in bottlenecks and scarcities that tend to drive prices up. By the same 
token, stagnation and recession tend to result in underutilization of capital and 
excess supply of many commodities, hence (where markets are unfettered) declin- 
ing prices. The stylized scheme set forth by Van Gelderen (1913) focuses on 
turning points between inflationary (A) periods and deflationary (B) periods. 
Various authors have suggested different long-wave chronologies, depend- 
ing on the particular countries and time series they were studying. A summary 
can be found in Van Duijn (1983, p. 163). The most orthodox (i.e., consistent 
with the ideas of Kondratieff) is that of Mandel (1980), which is adopted 
hereafter for convenience. Bieshaar and Kleinknecht (1983) have shown that 
other chronologies are often better for particular countries, but not necessarily 
for the world as a whole. In any case, the differences are not great. 
Bieshaar and Kleinknecht have also carried out econometric tests compar- 
ing six of the chronologies, including Mandel's, in terms of average growth rates 
during A and subsequent B periods for a number of time series for industrial 
production, net national product, gross national product, and gross domestic 
product, depending on availability. They concluded that statistical evidence of 
the existence of waves since 1890 is quite strong and robust, but in the case of 
the countries with large internal markets (the UK, France, Federal Republic of 
Germany, and the US) statistical evidence of the waves prior to 1890 is weak. 
On the other hand, for some smaller countries with more open economies, 
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Figure 1 .  U K  wholeeale price index. (Source: N. Nakicenovic, IIASA, 1987.) 
Year 
Figure 2. US wholesale price index. (Source: N. Nakicenovic, IIASA, 1987.) 
notably Belgium, Sweden, and Italy - presumably better reflecting world market 
conditions - the statistical evidence for waves in the earlier period is stronger. 
Mandel's chronology is summarized in Table 1, respectively. 
Table 1 .  Mandel's chronology of long waves. 
Identification Phase Years 
First Kondratieff Wave 
Second Kondratieff Wave 
Third Kondratieff Wave 
Fourth Kondratieff Wave 
It must be emphasized that the evidence for the first two waves (and the 
entire chronology) is derived largely from commodity price data, which are by 
nature unreliable and incomplete. It must also be pointed out that the Mandel 
chronology differs somewhat from the chronology derived from Figures 9 and 4, 
respectively. 
Figure 9. UK wholesale price index, smoothed. (Source: N. Nakicenovic, IIASA, 1987.) 
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1.4. T h e  Schumpeterian thesis in brief 
The basic Schumpeter theory, as elaborated by Mensch (1975), combines the fol- 
lowing two basic hypotheses: 
(HI) Economic growth in A periods is propelled mainly by radical (Schum- 
peterian) innovations that create new, rapidly growing industries that, in 
turn, create jobs, income, and consumer demand. 
(H2) Radical innovations tend to cluster during periods of economic stagnation 
(B periods) due to lack of favorable short-term investment opportunities. 
There are possible refinements to this basic scheme. For example, Mensch 
argues that new products are inherently "demand-increasing," whereas new 
processes are inherently "cost-saving," and suggests that the latter tends to clus- 
ter during B periods. A direct test of this interesting corollary would require a 
much better database on the distribution of process innovations and/or improve- 
ments than exists currently. A further refinement would be to classify innova- 
tions as "Schumpeteriann (truly new combinations) or "Usheriann (gradual) 
improvements. One might then look for evidence that radical (Schumpeterian) 
innovations cluster in A periods while incremental (Usherian) improvements 
characterize B periods. 
The basic hypothesis examined here (H3) is that periods of rapid economic 
growth in a sector tend to occur some time after a critical technological barrier is 
overcome (to allow for development and infrastructure buildup). The sequence 
is as follows: 
One or more "technological breakthroughsn occur(s). 
A flurry of applications, improvements, refinements, and spin-offs follows. 
These tend to define a "technological trajectoryn (Nelson and Winter, 1977) 
that is determined by both the state of knowledge and feedback from early 
users. 
(3) Finally, there is a period of widespread adoption and diffusion. 
This characteristic sequence has been termed the "technological life cyclen 
(Utterback and Abernathy, 1979; Ayres, 1987, 1988). The significance of time 
lags for information diffusion and infrastructure buildup have been stressed by 
the neo-Austrian capital theorists (Faber, 1985). 
To elucidate this link between the life cycle and the long wave it is neces- 
sary to define barriers (or, in some cases, bottlenecks) and breakthroughs in suit- 
able terms. If the life cycle is to throw any light on the long wave, it is also 
necessary to explain why some technological breakthroughs have been particu- 
larly critical, in the sense of overwhelming all others in relative importance. A 
subsidiary hypothesis examined hereafter is that the most potent bottleneck- 
breaking innovations of the first two technological transformations were, essen- 
tially, energy, material, or capital saving in nature. These factors often go 
together, inasmuch as increased energy supply requires capital investment. 
Thus, the most important single use of early steam engines was to pump water 
out of the lower levels of coal and tin mines. Without the pumps many mines 
would have had to be closed, and new ones would have had to be dug - a mas- 
sive capital cost. Capital-saving innovations were of particular importance in 
t e r m  of economic growth, it would appear, because the binding constraint of 
limited consumer savings was thereby alleviated. 
Labor-saving innovations appear to have been important primarily in the 
industrial history of the US, where labor was always scarce and expensive. A 
new category of "demand-stimulatingn innovations has assumed increasing 
importance during the twentieth century, as other factors of production (energy, 
materials, capital, labor) have ceased to be binding constraints, at least in the 
industrial world. Scarcity of land, fresh water, and waste assimilative capacity 
are rapidly becoming binding constraints in the most crowded and industrialized 
parts of the world (especially in Japan). This trend strongly suggests that the 
next set of major technological breakthroughs will be focused on these problems. 
Thus, "telecornmutingn to work could well become a major option in cities (like 
Tokyo) where all forms of local transportation are permanently overcrowded and 
approaching gridlock. The unavailability of landfills and the intractable prob- 
lems associated with cleaning up and relocating toxic dump sites and reducing 
emissions of acids and greenhouse gases will eventually be reflected in the crea- 
tion of a market demand for a variety of new technologies in metal recycling, 
biodegradable plastics and refrigerants, nontoxic solvents, photovoltaic cells, and 
so on. Obviously, capital is still the scarcest factor in much of the Third World. 
The barrier-breakthrough metaphor is clear enough from common usage. 
In the last few decades the term breakthrough has been applied rather too freely. 
Often it has been used in cases where all that could be honestly claimed is a 
quantum improvement, even a small one. For present purposes, however, such 
cases are excluded. A breakthrough is, by definition, a discontinuous and very 
dramatic improvement in some technological capability. (Here a distinction is 
made between scientific and technological breakthroughs. The recent discovery 
of room-temperature superconductivity is an example of the former. The first 
commercially viable superconducting transmission line or generator will exem- 
plify the latter. Other historical examples will be discussed later.) 
A true breakthrough presupposes a bottleneck or 2 barrier. Some barriers 
are clearly perceived, and efforts to overcome them may be deliberate and even 
centrally coordinated - for example, the Manhattan Project, the war on cancer 
(unsuccessful to date), NASA's Apollo Project (successful in 1969), the space 
shuttle (a very limited success), and the Strategic Defense Initiative (initiated by 
President Reagan with such fanfare six years ago; jury still out, but increasingly 
skeptical). In other cases, especially in the past, the barrier may not have been 
clearly understood until it was on the verge of being overcome, or even until long 
afterward (Ayres, 1988). Nevertheless, the barrier was there. When a barrier is 
very high, as in the case where nobody really understands the problem (the 
beginning of the war on cancer) or the problem is of such a nature that only 
large-scale and expensive research can succeed (the atomic bomb, the Apollo 
Project, the synfuels program, or the harnessing of fusion power), there is no 
economic incentive for individual entrepreneurs to get into the game. This is 
because a small amount of technical progress is useful only to the next 
generation of researchers, and can have no short-term economic payoff. Putting 
it another way, as long as the state of the art is far away technologically speak- 
ing from the level needed to surmount the barrier, the return on R&D is likely to 
be low and therefore the actual amount of effort targeted at  the barrier is likely 
to be low (Ayres, 1988). 
Nevertheless, over time an accumulation of scientific and practical 
knowledge and experience from a variety of sources (or even a major but unex- 
pected step forward in some other field of science) will gradually reduce the bar- 
rier. Eventually, it reaches the point where a relatively small increment of pro- 
gress (in functional terms) may be enough to break through. (Indeed, this is the 
only way in which major breakthroughs occurred until recent decades). The 
most interesting cases with regard to the long wave seem to be of this kind. 
It is important to emphasize that the economic (or social) importance of a 
breakthrough bears no particular relationship with the brilliance or originality of 
the inventor or discoverer. On the one hand, while major leaps of intuition do 
occur from time to time, they may as easily apply to problems of trivial economic 
importance. For instance, a fast efficient strategy for solving Rubik's cube might 
display great intellectual prowess but have no significant economic value. On 
the other hand, very important inventions may be made by a plodding, wholly 
unimaginative, process of elimination. A classic example of the latter is Edison's 
invention of the incandescent light, which involved neither great intuitive leaps 
nor significant use of basic scientific knowledge. His contribution was his sys- 
tematic attention to the problem of electric lighting as a whole, rather than to its 
components (Josephson, 1959). It was, nevertheless, of enormous importance to 
the world by any standard. 
It also follows from the above that some of the arguments about the rela- 
tive importance of many small Usherian improvements, vis-d-vis a few big 
Schumpeterian leaps forward, are missing the point. Upon sufficiently micro- 
scopic examination almost every major invention can probably be shown to have 
evolved through a sequence of small improvements and modifications from some 
predecessor. Whether the process took place in many minds or one is essentially 
irrelevant to the question of its importance. An invention or discovery is a 
breakthrough in our terms if, and only if, it creates important new technical pos- 
sibilities. An event is not a breakthrough simply because it was hard to achieve 
or because it represents an unusually rapid or discontinuous improvement over 
its predecessor, although the latter is also a characteristic of breakthroughs. 
2. The First Technological Transformation ca. 1775 
Schumpeter attributed the first Kondratieff A period (1792-1825, according to 
Mandel) to the 9ndustrial revolutionn: cotton textiles, iron, and steam power. 
His thesis is supported by a cluster of major innovations centering roughly 
around 1775. Admittedly, the very existence of an industrial revolution in the 
last decades of the eighteenth century is a matter of dispute among historians. 
After all, the term itself was not coined until half a century later by the French 
economist J. Blanqui (1827) and popularized later by Alfred Toynbee, Sr. No 
doubt it conveys a sense of sharp discontinuity that contemporaries might have 
been hard put to recognize. The underlying continuity and overlapping multipli- 
city of causes and effects have been stressed by a number of distinguished his- 
torians, such as John U. Nef (1954), Fernand Braudel (1981), and David Landes 
(1969). Undeniably, the industrial revolution was no "bolt from the blue," but 
had roots deep in the past. 
Yet a discontinuity in growth rates did occur, nonetheless, with a clear 
breakpoint around 1781, the slump year. Before that year, economic activity in 
England had been more or less stagnant since Agincourt (1415), with a plateau 
of prosperity during the fifteenth century, a decline in the first half of the six- 
teenth century, and a very slow recovery thereafter. After that watershed year 
of 1781, economic growth suddenly accelerated. It reached 2% per annum, on 
average, for the first time in history, and remained above that level for the next 
century (Hoffmann, cited in Deane, 1979, p. 3). Indeed, "more than half the 
growth in the shipments of coal and the mining of copper, more than three- 
quarters of the increase of broad cloths, four-fifths of that of printed cloth, and 
nine-tenths of the exports of cotton goods were concentrated in the last eighteen 
years of the century" (Ashton, 1949, p. 18). During this period "the production 
of cotton cloth quintupled, pig-iron production quadrupled, foreign trade 
(whether measured in shipping tonnage or values) nearly tripled, and total 
industrial production doubledn (Briggs, 1963, p. 93). 
Evidently there is no difficulty in identifying the leading sectors, in Van 
Gelderen's terms. They have already been named above: cotton cloth, coal, and 
iron. The technological barriers that were broken through between 1760 and 
1775 remain to be identified. Historians have largely settled this issue. In brief, 
the bottlenecks were scarcity of mechanical power and scarcity of "cleann 
(sulfur-free) fuel. Ironworks of the seventeenth century utilized charcoal, but 
charcoal availability was limited and its price was rising. The conversion from 
charcoal to coke (from coal) was one of the preconditions of the great break- 
through. This conversion began slowly between 1707 and 1709 a t  the ironworks 
of Abraham Darby in Coalbrookdale, on the Severn, but the techniques remained 
proprietary for more than four decades. Use of coke did not spread widely 
among other UK ironworks until the 1760s as decade. of experiments with vari- 
ous ores and coals finally enabled smelters to produce pig iron of reasonable 
quality a t  competitive prices (with help from tariffs). 
One of the main factors involved in substituting coke for charcoal was a 
need for higher smelting temperatures, which required larger volume blast fur- 
naces (Landes, 1969, p. 90). This required more powerful air pumps than most 
contemporary waterpower sources could produce. John Smeaton introduced the 
first piston-driven air pump for the Carron Ironworks in 1762, but it was not 
until 1776 that Wilkinson first applied a steam engine (purchased from Boulton 
k Watt) to this purpose. The puddling-rolling process for making wrought iron 
of engineering quality, using coal instead of charcoal, was patented by Henry 
Cort (1783-1784), although the process was not widely adopted until around 
1800. It was the key breakthrough in iron making and was an important prere- 
quisite to the later large-scale use of wrought iron as a structural material, nota- 
bly for rails. 
To avoid the deadly effects of sulfur contamination from the coal, Cort fol- 
lowed the lead of Huntsman (1740) and others in adopting the so-called "rever- 
beratory furnacen (first used by the copper smelters) to ensure that the molten 
iron had no direct contact with the fuel. As the pig iron was stirred (puddled) 
and progressively decarburized by reaction with added oxides, its melting point 
rose above the furnace temperature and it gradually solidified. The red-hot 
semisolid agglomeration of relatively pure iron flakes and liquid slag was then 
forged and deslagged by reciprocating "tilt hammersn or, after the introduction 
of rotative steam engines, hot-rolled by slotted rollers directly into bars. This 
last innovation alone cut the time required for forging by a factor of 15 (Landes, 
1969, p. 91). 
To cope with rising industrial demand for domestic iron, the supply of coal 
had to increase also. This meant more and deeper mines. Many mines were 
below the water table by the beginning of the eighteenth century, and the prob- 
lem was rapidly becoming acute. The Newcomen-Savery steam-pumping engine 
(1712) was an elegant solution, for its time. In all, about 60 copies or minor 
variants of the Newcomen design had already been built in the UK by 1733, 
when the master patent expired. A few more were built elsewhere in western 
Europe and Russia. Some 300 were built between 1734 and 1781, entirely for 
pumping water from coal mines (Briggs, 1982, p. 51). The early Newcomen 
engines used from 30 to 45 pounds (lb.) of coal per horsepower-hour (hp-hr) 
Improvements in the design introduced by Smeaton (ca. 1770) cut the fuel con- 
sumption to 17-18 lb. per hp-hr, for engines built after that time (Von Tunzel- 
mann, 1978, p. 67-69). 
Smeaton's work was immediately overshadowed by James Watt's condens- 
ing steam engine. The invention of the condenser was a major breakthrough 
(1769). The new engine cut fuel consumption to as little as 7.5 lb. per hp-hr for 
pumping (Von Tunzelmann, 1978), about one-third of the level of the old Newco- 
men engines and less than one-half of the best Smeaton versions. This was a 
great improvement. As a direct consequence of its lower fuel (i.e., steam) con- 
sumption per unit of power output, Watt's engine was far more compact and 
therefore more suitable for rotative applications. It was also more standardized 
and probably better engineered than its predecessors. Its importance, however, 
cannot be deduced from these facts alone. 
The firm of Boulton & Watt (B&W) was founded in 1774. It sold its first 
two new engines in 1776, one to the Bersham Ironworks of John Wilkinson (as 
already noted above), and the other to a colliery for pumping. Meanwhile, Wil- 
kinson made another extremely important contribution by inventing an 
improved type of boring mill (based on earlier work by John Smeaton). This, in 
turn, made Wilkinson not only the first customer, but also the recommended 
supplier of cylinders for B&W steam engines until 1895 when the firm built a 
boring mill in its own shop. With regard to boring, Wilkinson's improvement 
over the earlier machining accuracy was as great as Watt's was for steam 
engines. Based on Boulton's assertion that a 5Cinch cylinder boring "doth not 
err by the thickness of an old shilling," Wilkinson seems to have built the first 
true machine tool (Ferguson, 1967, p. 272). Again, we have an invention that 
allowed a large discontinuous improvement in performance. It added 
significantly to the efficiency, and hence the value, of the BkW engine. Indeed, 
Watt himself estimated that his engines would only have been able to cut the 
fuel consumption of Newcomen-type engines by a factor of two, based on the 
separate condenser alone (Scherer, 1984, p. 19); Smeaton atually did nearly as 
well. In any case, Wilkinson's invention of the boring machine was key to the 
effectiveness of Watt's steam engine. 
Some further words of caution are necessary. The first few engines built by 
Boulton k Watt were scarcely more than prototypes, and Watt was fully occu- 
pied with problems of development and improvement, at least until 1785 when 
the design more or less stabilized. Among the major patented improvements 
were: 
double-acting valve arrangement (1781-1782), which doubled the power out- 
put of a single piston, thus further reducing the weight of metal needed to 
generate a unit power output 
"sun and planetn gearing (1781), to convert reciprocating motion to rotary 
motion 
"paralleln motion (1784), to keep a rigid piston rod moving vertically while 
attached to an oscillating beam. 
All of the above were helpful or essential in supplying steam power for 
"rotative motion." This was a major obsession not only of Watt but of his con- 
temporaries. The importance of this may be gathered from the fact that a 
number of Newcomen engines had been used simply to pump water from the tail- 
race of a waterwheel back to the head, so it could be used again and again to 
drive the wheel (Briggs, 1982, p. 56). This inefficient procedure may be regarded 
as the most effective method of converting reciprocating motion to rotary motion 
(given the availability of a waterwheel) prior to about 1780. The obvious solu- 
tion, the standard crank-and-flywheel, was patented by James Pickard and 
Matthew Wasborough in 1780, thus forcing Watt to find another method; since 
the crank was well known, Watt may have thought it unpatentable. During the 
period of Boulton k Watt's official monopoly, which ended in 1800, about 490 
engines were licensed (Von Tunzelmann, 1978, p. 27). Others built at least as 
many pirate versions. The fuel savings achieved by customers were indeed sub- 
stantial, otherwise they would not have made the investment and paid the sub- 
stantial royalties. But the direct incremental addition to the economic growth 
rate of the UK over the period 1780-1830 has been estimated by Von Tunzel- 
mann a t  only one-quarter of one percent, when compared with what it would 
have been without those savings (Von Tunzelmann, 1978, chap. 6). 
However, the assumption of other things being equal (eeteris paribus) is 
inappropriate, and Von Tunzelmann's %hat if" calculation is fundamentally 
misleading. It assumed that customers of Boulton k Watt (or their imitators) 
could have used less efficient steam engines of the Newcomen-Smeaton type - 
albeit a t  somewhat higher fuel cost, the difference in fuel costs translating into a 
reduction in capital formation. This convenient assumption ignores the multipli- 
cative power of the new capabilities. For instance, Wilkinson'a boring machine 
and the various reciprocating-to-rotary power transmission devices were direct 
outgrowths of Watt's invention. Among them they made steam engines suitable 
for a host of new applications, such as driving flour mills, gristmills, cotton- 
spinning "water frames," and "mulesn; introducing power looms and scouring 
and washing machines into the woolen industry; using bellows for blast furnaces; 
and installing rolling mills into the new puddling-rolling process. Frederick 
Konig's rotary press, on which the London Times began printing in 1814, 
depended on a steam engine for power. Given the shortage of suitable water- 
power sites, especially near London, there was really no choice. Newcomen 
engines would not suffice for these applications. 
In addition, the superior efficiency of rotative steam-powered air pumps for 
iron smelters and rotative steam-powered rolling mills for wrought-iron manufac- 
turing (as compared with the hypothetical alternative) would have had a major 
impact on the price of UK iron, and consequently on its ability to compete 
against Swedish imports. In 1750 the UK imported tw-thirds of the iron it 
used. Yet with the help of the new technology it became the world's most cost- 
efficient iron producer and a major exporter of iron by 1814 (Landes, 1969, p. 
95). In Von Tunzelmann's hypothetical case this could not have occurred. 
The importance of the new capabilities created by steam power is revealed 
more clearly still when the high-pressure steam engine finally arrived after 1800, 
eventually making the steam railroad possible. To evaluate the economic impact 
of the railway in terms of fuel savings vis-6-vis horses would be to miss the point 
entirely. In short, the popular judgment that Watt's engine was the fulcrum of 
the first industrial revolution seems much sounder than Von Tunzelmann's 
attempt to debunk it. Yet his emphasis on the vastly greater economic impact of 
steam power in the period after 1825 due in part to further gains in efficiency 
(Figure 4 is entirely justified. 
This is not to suggest that other technological innovations played no major 
role in triggering the economic expansion that began in 1780. On the contrary, a 
series of very important innovations in the machine industries created the condi- 
tion for the dramatic advances in all areas of manufacturing and engineering 
that occurred during the last decade of the eighteenth century and the first half 
of the nineteenth century. Starting with Wilkinson's boring machine, a series of 
key inventions created most of the modern types of machine tools, especially 
industrial lathes, over the next five decades. These tools could not function, of 
course, without hard steel-cutting edges. The source of this steel was Benjamin 
Huntsman's crucible steel process (ca. 1740s), a significant improvement over the 
earlier "cementation" process for hardening wrought-iron bars by heating them 
in a charcoal fire. Steel from Huntsman's process could only be made in small 
quantities, at very high cost in fuel. It was, nevertheless, indispensable for 
cutlery, watch springs, and cutting tools. 
So far, the discussion has focused entirely on coal, iron, steam, and machine 
tools. Most historians, as well as engineers, have seen these developments as the 
more fundamental drivers of subsequent economic growth. Nevertheless, the 
most spectacular economic growth of the 1780-1830 period was recorded by the 
cotton-spinning and cotton-weaving industry, where mechanization and (later) 
the "factory systemn were first applied on a large scale. In Rostow's words, this 
was the "original leading sector in the first 'take-off " (1960, p. 53). Why 
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Figure 5. Performance of steam engines: fuel consumption and thermal efficiency. 
cotton? The beginnings of this process can be traced to the increasing popular- 
ity of light cotton fabrics imported from East India in the seventeenth century. 
Cotton fiber was available also from other nearer sources, and imports of cotton 
cloth from India were cut off in the early 1800s to protect the woolen industry. 
Furthermore, UK consumers were interested in heavier fabrics for shirts, chem- 
ises, etc. As a result there was an opportunity for domestic cotton spinners and 
weavers to produce a cotton-linen hybrid (called fustian). 
In the beginning of the eighteenth century the cotton-linen industry, like 
the woolen industry, was exclusively a family affair, confined largely to Lan- 
cashire. Most cotton workers were also farmers. During the off-season the man 
of the family would operate a hand loom and the wife would operate a spinning 
wheel to make the yarn. The capabilities of the two were unequal, however. It  
took three or four spinners to supply one full-time weaver by traditional methods 
(Deane, 1979, p. 89). An even more severe imbalance was created by the inven- 
tion by John Kay in 1733 of the flying shuttle, which essentially doubled the out- 
put of hand looms when it was adopted widely in the 1750s. This created a 
powerful demand for more efficient means of spinning cotton thread. 
There were various attempts to mechanize the process of cotton spinning, 
but the first that proved successful was James Hargreaves's spinning jenny, 
invented about 1764 and patented in 1770. The jenny duplicated the action of a 
spinning wheel (stretching accompanied and followed by twisting), but it permit- 
ted a single operator to control a number of spindles simultaneously. Har- 
greaves's patent specified 16 spindles. The number rapidly increased; by 1784 
jennies could handle 80 spindles, and by 1800 the number had risen from 100 to 
120. It reached 1,200 by 1832 (Mann, 1958). In effect, the productivity of a sin- 
gle operator was multiplied by lWfold in the space of a generation and 1,00& 
fold in two generations (Figure 6). 
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Quantity output of cotton thread was not the only problem that needed to 
be addressed. Wheel-spun cotton thread was generally too weak to serve as the 
warp on a hand loom, so flax was used for this purpose. The resulting products, 
fustian, was neither soft nor easy to sew. The breakthrough that permitted all- 
cotton fabrics was a spinning machine capable of spinning stronger thread. This 
was the smcalled water frame or throstle of Richard Arkwright, patented in 
1769. It operated in a manner different from the wheel or jenny and stretched 
the rovings by passing them between a succession of rollers to increase fineness. 
It was designed, from the start, for mechanization, using waterpower. Arkwright 
also used a steam engine (the first in the cotton industry), but it was of the 
Newcomen-type and was used to pump water to supply a waterwheel. The first 
steam-powered self-acting mule for spinning cotton was patented in 1792 by 
John Kelly. Even so, development for widespread factory use by Richard 
Roberts and the Sharp Brothers, of Manchester, took three more decades (Mann, 
1985). 
A few years later Arkwright's invention was surpassed by Samuel 
Crompton's mule, which combined the principles of the water frame and the 
jenny into a single machine for stretching and twisting simultaneously (patented 
in 1779). Crompton's thread was fine enough, for the first time, to enable UK 
weavers to rival Indian muslins and calicoes in quality. By 1885 the water-frame 
technology became generally available to other manufacturers and was widely 
used. 
The imbalance between spinning and weaving was reversed by the 1780s. 
Since domestic and export demand for cotton cloth was soaring, the bottleneck 
was now at  the weaving end of the process. Oddly, mechanization of weaving 
lagged, partly due to the opposition of cottage weavers, but mainly due to its 
greater complexity. The immediate response was for part-time farmer-weavers 
to become full-time weavers. Many of them gave up agriculture and moved into 
the towns of Lancashire. Other technical processes improved rapidly, creating 
new specializations and making household operation of looms more difficult. 
The first power loom is credited to Edmund Cartwright (1787), but it had 
several drawbacks - notably a tendency to break threads - that made its use 
uneconomical. Cartwright's factory burned down a few years later. A second 
attempt in Manchester soon failed due to worker sabotage. However, a number 
of inventors continued to work on the problem. One of the most notable was 
Samuel Horrocks, who developed a commercial power loom (1813), which was 
fairly successful. It was later improved upon by Richard Roberts (1822) and 
manufactured in large numbers by the firm of Roberts, Hill & Co. Even so, 
power looms did not completely displace hand looms until mid-century, despite 
continuously declining wages for weavers as cotton cloth prices fell. 
The full mechanization of the cotton industry and the building of the rail- 
roads could not have occurred much before 1830, as it happens, because the 
requirements for large-scale manufacturing of the necessary machines were not 
available until then. Most eighteenth-century machines, including spinning jen- 
nies, mules, carding machines, and looms, were built of wood. Even gears and 
axles were of wood in most cases. It was only in the first decade of the 
nineteenth century that cast iron began to be used for machine frames. This was 
a prerequisite for rigidity, without which cutting accuracy was unattainable. But 
of course a machinery-building industry requires more than rigid frames. There 
was a need for metal-cutting machines capable of making gear wheels, nuts and 
bolts, axles, flanged wheels, pistons, cranks, and other iron parts that could not 
easily be cast or rolled into final form. 
Virtually all the necessary tools had already been invented by clockmakers, 
watchmakers, opticians, instrument makers, and cabinetmakers for use on softer 
materials like brass or wood. These tools were not robust or rigid enough for 
working on harder metals. The French mechanical genius Jacques de Vaucanson 
was a transitional figure. He developed prototype engineering versions of several 
key machines. However, his prototypes, built between 1750 and 1780, were not 
manufactured or widely used. Most are now lost or have ended up in museums. 
The same is true for Senot's advanced screw-cutting lathe (1795). In the UK, 
the demand for mechanization was more insistent, and inventors flocked to fill 
the need. Wilkinson's boring machine (1775) was the first. He was followed by 
Henry Maudslay, who built the first practical engine lathe (1797), and a host of 
others, including James Fox, Marc Brunel, Matthew Murray, Richard Roberts, 
Joseph Clement, James Nasmyth, and Joseph Whitworth in the UK. Some of 
the inventors from the US included Oliver Evans, Eli Whitney, Simeon North, 
and Thomas Blanchard. These men invented (or re-invented) all of the major 
types of machine tools and created the machine-tool industry, without which 
largescale manufacturing would be impossible. By 1830 all major types (except 
the surface grinder) had been developed to the degree 'that would be instantly 
recognizable to a machinist todayn (Ferguson, 1967, p. 281). 
It is worth emphasizing that the metallurgical innovations of the eighteenth 
century, culminating in Cort's puddling-rolling process, had the effect of break- 
ing a binding constraint on energy availability (the shortage of wood for char- 
coal) by substituting coke for coal in iron making. A constraint on the avail- 
ability of coal itself was relieved by the application of steam power to draining 
coal mines. Only the mechanization of cotton spinning can be regarded as a 
labor-saving innovation; it was part of a catalytic feedback process of demand 
growth, responding to falling consumer prices, in turn attributable to radical 
(Schumpeterian) innovations in production technology. 
3. The Second Technological Transformation ca. 1825 
Schumpeter attributed the second Kondratieff A period (1847-1873, according to 
Mandel) to 'railroadization," although the mechanization of the cotton textile 
industry gave a tremendous impetus to iron-working and machine-tool develop- 
ment. The iron industry continued to grow rapidly also. The major break- 
through in this case would seem to be the opening of the Stockton-Darlington 
Railroad. (1825), which operated successfully with several steam-powered locorn+ 
tives as well as horsepowered vehicles. It was followed by the famous Rainhill 
trials (1829), which were decisively won by Stephenson's locomotive 'Rocket." 
It is unfair to ignore the accomplishments of others whose work was a 
necessary prerequisite to the success of railroads. Ironically, the condensing 
steam engine, discussed above, does not belong in this category. Watt's atm+ 
spheric engine was too bulky and heavy, in relation to its power output, to be 
mobile. An early attempt to use steam power for hauling heavy loads was the 
steam carriage of Nicholas Cugnot (1767-1769), of which two were built and one 
still survives in a Paris museum. Cugnot was also the first to use high-pressure 
steam and probably deserves credit as the real inventor of the steam locomotive, 
though he did not use iron rails. The long life of Watt's basic patent on the 
separate condenser and his opposition to high-pressure steam apparently 
discouraged other would-be inventors over the next several decades. Indeed, 
Ashton (1949) conjectures that this may have delayed the introduction of the 
railway by a generation. 
Be that as it may, Richard Trevithick in Cornwall and Oliver Evans in the 
USA independently began serious experiments with high pressures about the 
time Watt's patent expired - although neither used a condenser, the heart of 
Watt's invention. (Most steam locomotives, even well into the twentieth cen- 
tury, simply 'puffedn their exhausted steam into the atmosphere, but had to 
haul a replacement water supply). Trevithick patented a high-pressure steam- 
powered locomotive in 1802. Trevithick built several models and carried out 
several demonstrations, of which the most important was in February 1804 when 
a five-ton engine carried ten tons of iron and 70 men over a distance of nine 
miles on a cast-iron plateway in Wales. However, problems included a tendency 
of the castiron plates to break under the weight, not to mention the danger of 
steam explosions and fires. Trevithick persisted until 1811, when he went bank- 
rupt and abandoned the business for a decade while trying to recoup his fortune 
in South America. After his return, he concentrated on developing steam- 
powered road vehicles, with only modest success. 
Beginning about 1812 several large collieries introduced steam-powered 
tramways, designed and built by such men aa John Blenkinsop, Matthew Mur- 
ray, William Hedley, and George Stephenson. Stephenson was the first to make 
and run a locomotive with flanged wheels on a track laid with cast-iron rails 
(1814). This engine, along with others built by Stephenson, was well constructed 
and operated successfully for a number of years. His reputation grew thereafter 
and won for him the job of chief engineer for the Stockton-Darlington, mentioned 
above, and then the Liverpool and Manchester Railway, which opened in 1830. 
It was for the latter that the Rainhill trials were held, to select a locomotive 
design. The trial was won by Robert Stephenson's "Rocket," which sustained a 
remarkable 40 miles per hour (mph) over a distance of several miles. 
A host of subsidiary problems had to be solved before railways could 
replace horse-drawn vehicles for freight (or passenger) transportation. The 
power source was only one of them. Another, very vexing, problem for the early 
railways was the conviction of most engineers that smooth steel wheels would 
lack adhesion on the rails, limiting track gradients to 1% or less. It was evident 
that adhesion could be increased by improving the suspension, to prevent wheels 
from losing contact with the rails. The first contribution to a solution waa to 
mount the locomotive on "bogies," first used by William Chapman (patented 
1812). Another possible solution to this problem was Stephenson's "steam 
spring" (patented 1815), which was used by him to avoid the Chapman patent 
until steam springs were in turn displaced by the development of laminated steel 
leaf springs. But the barrier, in this case, turned out to be more apparent than 
real. William Norris, a locomotive builder from Philadelphia, proved by direct 
demonstration in 1836 that a locomotive could haul a load up a 7% grade. 
A more serious problem was the tendency of the brittle cast-iron rails to 
break. No single solution was developed, but a major step forward was the use 
of wrought iron. The rolling mill had already become an essential component of 
the Cort process. A further development was needed, however, to roll wrought- 
iron rails on a prescribed cross section. This waa accomplished in 1820 by John 
Birkenhead of Bedlington Ironworks. The wrought-iron rails were about twice as 
expensive as castiron, but lasted much longer. Costs of iron declined sharply, 
too, between 1790 and 1830 because of technical improvements in the processes. 
For example, the original version of the Cort puddling-rolling process lost half of 
the pig-iron feedstock to the slag. A series of changes culminating in a substitu- 
tion of roasted tap cinder for sand for the furnace bed in the late 1830s, finally 
reduced the loss to 8%, while speeding up the conversion (Landes, 1969, p. 93). 
It should be pointed out that the railway-building booms of the 1830s and 
1840s depended on the existence of a large-scale iron industry. Based on the 
iron-making technology of the 1820s as much as eight tons of coal were needed to 
make one ton of iron. A sharp increase in demand for iron, at this time, would 
have put an enormous, and perhaps unsustainable, strain on the coal-mining 
industry. Fortunately, this was obviated by a discovery by James Nielson - 
supervisor of a Glasgow gasworks - in 1828. His idea was to preheat the blast 
air for iron smelting. The first version of his blast stove at  Clyde Ironworks, 
Glasgow, achieved a temperature of less than 100mC, but the benefits were 
immediately obvious. In a very few years blast air temperatures were up to 
300°C (Schubert, 1958, p. 110). The impact on iron smelting was dramatic; fuel 
consumption per unit output dropped threefold (Schubert, 19581, while furnace 
output rose sharply. The reduction in fuel consumption and increased output 
made possible by these accomplishments (see Figure 7) were critical to the 
economics of rail transportation. 
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Figure 7. Production of iron and steel: tons of input (C or Fe) per ton of output (Fe). 
The basic components of railways - locomotives and rails - were mostly 
developed before 1830, thus opening the way to rapid and widespread railway 
building, not only in the UK but in other countries. The 29-mile Liverpool and 
Manchester line, which cost P 820,000 was completed by Stephenson in 1830 and 
was an immediate success. Railways were opened for public traffic before 1830 
in the United States, Austria, and France, and very soon afterward in many 
other countries. The first steam locomotive used in the US was the "Stourbridge 
Lion," purchased from England for the Delaware & Hudson Railroad (1827). 
Peter Cooper's "Tom Thumb," used by the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad was built 
in 1830. The first major railway-building boom in the UK occurred in 
1835-1837, when many companies were formed, mostly local, and a number of 
disconnected point-tepoint lines, such as the Newcastle and Carlisle, Canterbury 
and Whitstable, Leeds and York, and London and Birmingham (Great Western), 
were established. These early investments produced high returns, commonly 
returning 10% or more on their capital (Taylor, 1942, p. 23). This attracted 
more capital to the industry. In the second boom period (1844-1846) new rail- 
way companies were formed with an aggregate capital of L 180 million. Indeed, 
this boom consumed virtually all the capital available for investment in the UK 
at the time (Taylor, 1942). Incidentally, railways cost twice as much to build in 
the UK as in Germany, and four times as much as in the US (Briggs, 1982, p. 
110). It appears that this was mostly due to excessive costs imposed on the rail- 
way companies by Parliament to pacify influential landowners (Taylor, 1942, pp. 
23-24). This excess cost burden may have seriously diminished the long-term 
benefits of railroadization in the UK, vis-ci-vis other industrializing countries. 
Another direct consequence of the railway-building boom, in the UK at  
least, was the very rapid introduction of telegraphy. William Cooke and Charles 
Wheatstone's first practical (five-needle) telegraph system was constructed for 
the Great Western Railway, from Paddington Station (London) to W. Drayton, 
a distance of 13 miles (1838). It was extended four years later to Slough (Gar- 
ratt, 1958, p. 657). Thereafter, virtually all newly built railway lines were 
accompanied by telegraph lines. Wheatstone and Cooke formed the Electric 
Telegraph Co. in 1846; 4,000 miles of line had been built in the UK by 1852 
(Garratt, 1958, p. 659). While telegraphic communication soon developed its 
own raison d'stre, it was the needs of railways that provided a strong initial 
impetus and created a demand for still better means of communication. 
By contrast, telegraphy got a slower start in the US, even though the sys- 
tem developed by Samuel Morse (with assistance from Joseph Henry and others) 
was technically superior and was eventually adopted in most countries. Morse's 
system did not achieve recognition until the US Congress appropriated money 
for a demonstration line between Washington, DC, and Baltimore, MD. The 
demonstration took place successfully in 1844. Again, it was railroads that were 
the early adopters. 
The railway was, of course, an application of steam power, and an aspect of 
its diffusion. Steam power was also rapidly applied to ships and riverboats, espe- 
cially in the US with its large territory and big rivers. The regular use of steam- 
powered ferries on the Hudson and Delaware - experiments began as early as 
1763 (Henry), 1785 (Fitch), 1787 (Rurnsey) - began in 1807 with Robert Fulton's 
Clermont (Briggs, 1982, p. 127). Fulton's rival, John Stevens, is credited with 
the first sea voyage (1809), when he steamed from Hoboken to Philadelphia 
around Cape May, N J  (Briggs, 1982). 
Steamships began to displace sailing ships in the 1820s. At this time the 
US merchant marine had 22,000 tons of steam-powered shipping, 1.7% of the 
total fleet (USBOC, 1975). By 1850 this fraction had increased to 15% (USBOC, 
1975). The pace of substitution slowed in the 18509, for some reason, but 
increased thereafter. Nevertheless, only 33% of the fleet was steam powered as 
late as 1880 (USBOC, 1975). Thereafter, penetration was very rapid, but it took 
place mostly in the period of the third transformation rather than the second. 
Undoubtedly the most important application of steam power after railways 
was in the textile industry, as a supplement (and later, substitute) for water- 
power. Yet in 1800, when Watt's master patent expired, it is estimated that 
there were fewer than 1,000 stationary steam engines in the UK, totaling perhaps 
10,000 hp (Landes, 1969, p. 104). By 1815, however, the total was apparently 20 
times greater (210,000 hp), all in mines or mills. By the middle of the century 
the total of stationary engines had increased to 500,000 hp, in addition to nearly 
800,000 hp in locomotives and ships (Landes, 1969). At that time (1850), the 
cotton industry was still using 11,000 hp of waterpower, but 71,000 hp of steam. 
The woolen industry, which was slower to mechanize, used 6,800 hp of water- 
power, as against 12,600 hp steam (Land-, 1969). 
The development of the gaslight industry also contributed significantly to 
the second technological transformation. The fact that coal could be "gasifiedn 
by heating it in a retort - a crude version of coking - was discovered in the six- 
teenth century. The first-known attempt to use coal gas for illumination was 
made by George Dixon, a colliery owner, in 1760. It was quickly abandoned. A 
number of people conducted experiments, but the two fathers of the gaslight 
were Philip Lebon in France, who began work in 1791 using gas from wood, and 
William Murdock in the UK, an associate of Watt, who began work in 1792 
using coal gas. Murdock adapted the oil-burning "Argandn lantern to use gas as 
a fuel. The Argand lamp, designed by Pierre Argand, a Swiss, was the first oil 
lamp to house a tubular wick inside a class chimney. It gave a very steady 
flame. This lamp was introduced to the UK in 1783 (Elton, 1958, p. 263). Mur- 
dock substituted an annular gas burner, but retained the chimney. In 1802 he lit 
the main building of Boulton & Watt's Soho works, in Birmingham. By 1804 
B&W was undertaking to build gaslight systems for factories; the first customer 
was a large cotton mill at Salford. Meanwhile, Lebon had been demonstrating 
his system, including his patented "thermolamp" in Paris. Unfortunately, Lebon 
was murdered in 1804 in Paris, and his work was not continued until many years 
later. Having seen one of Lebon's demonstrations, a German named Friedrich 
Albrecht Winzer (later anglicized to Winsor) came to London in 1803 with the 
intention of creating a complete gas-lighting system with a central gas plant and 
distribution of gas throughout a district (Elton, 1958). He found backers and 
succeeded in forming the National Light and Heat Co. in 1806, later changed to 
the Gas Light and Coke Co. (GL&C). Despite opposition by B&W (and others), 
the company received its charter in 1812 and construction finally began in 1815. 
By December of that year 26 miles of mains had been built (Elton, 1958, p. 269). 
Nevertheless, as of 1815 four major technical problems remained to be 
solved before gas lighting could be a commercial success. The first was an 
efficient process to gasify coal and remove the tar and sulfurous impurities from 
the gas. Samuel Clegg (chief engineer of GL&C) was the first to introduce a 
crude gas purification process, bubbling the gas through a mixture of lime and 
water (ca. 1812). An improved dry-liming process was invented in 1817 by Reu- 
ben Phillips, and a process in which the gas was passed between layers of quick- 
lime was developed in 1823 by Clegg's son-in-law, John Malam. It remained 
standard until the end of the nineteenth century (Elton, 1958, pp. 269-271). The 
retorting process itself was still very inefficient - much of the solid residue (coke) 
was wasted. The water-gas process, in which steam reacts with incandescent 
coke to produce a mixture of hydrogen gas and carbon monoxide, was invented 
in 1834 by A.F. Selligue in France (Williamson and Daum, 1959, p. 37). This 
process was eventually adopted widely by the gas industry. 
Another technical problem was the distribution. Cast-iron pipes were suit- 
able for the mains, but the smaller diameter pipes for distribution to individual 
burners were difficult to manufacture. For a few years old gun barrels were 
actually used, along with pipe fabricated from strip iron, welded down a seam. 
These pipes were prone to leak. The solution to this problem was a method of 
drawing wrought-iron pipe over a mandrel, invented by Cornelius Whitehouse 
(1825) and perfected over the next decade. A third problem, and a serious one, 
was the lack of an efficient and safe burner. Combustion was not well under- 
stood, and inefficient burners tended to allow unburned gas (partly carbon 
monoxide) to escape, thus making indoor use risky. The solution was simple 
enough: to draw air into the gas stream below the point of combustion. But it 
was not invented till ca. 1840 and eventually resulted in the development of the 
Bunsen burner in 1855. Thus, gas was used primarily for exterior lighting until 
the 1860s and even later. The gas water heater (geyser) was invented by Benja- 
min W. Maughan in 1865; the gas ring for cooking and heating was not intr* 
duced until 1867; and the use of radiants to increase the efficiency of a gas fire 
appeared in 1880 (Elton, 1958). Surprisingly, it was not until after Thomas A. 
Edison's incandescent electric light (in 1879) that a truly effective interior 
gaslight was finally perfected (in 1885) by Carl Auer von Welsbach: the incan- 
descent gas mantle. The fourth major problem, metering, was not solved satis- 
factorily until the end of the nineteenth century. Thus, while gas lighting was an 
innovation of the first technological transformation, and grew rapidly throughout 
the second, it did not reach its full potential until the third. In fact, gas lighting 
reached its maximum penetration in 1910, when it was finally overtaken by the 
electric light. 
Again, the nature of the key technological innovations of the second 
transformation is worth noting. The railroad offered a new service to a wide 
variety of customers, of course, but its first and foremost users (and investors) 
were the coal mine owners. Many of the first railroads linked coal mines to 
ports. Later, they supplemented, and finally supplanted, the canals for shipment 
of heavy goods (e.g., coal). Dramatic reductions in delivery time meant reduc- 
tions in the amount of goods in the pipeline. This translated into significant c a p  
ital savings for the economy. Steam power also made the mines themselves more 
efficient, again conserving capital as well as labor. Finally, as noted already, 
Nielson's hot blast both saved coal and increased the output of blast furnaces. 
This conserved capital in two ways: in mining and in iron making. The sharply 
increased demand for iron to build the railroads and for coal to supply the grow- 
ing need for gaslight in the cities could probably not have been met otherwise. 
Continued mechanization of the textile industry was still the only significant 
example of a labor-saving technology. 
4. The Third Technological Transformation ca. 1870-1890 
Whereas the leading sectors of 1780-1800 and 1830-1850 are easily identified, 
this is less true of the 1880s and 18905, for the simple reason that major 
advances occurred in a number of different industries at roughly the same time 
and the geographic center of the changes was less focused on a single country. 
There were, in fact, two clusters of innovations, corresponding to two distinct 
groups of leading sectors. The first two were steel and petroleum, each of which 
began a period of sustained boom in the 18708 in the United States. Later, elec- 
tric light, telephones, and the engineering industries (sewing machines, bicycles, 
and automobiles) emerged. In addition, the gaslight industry continued to grow 
and prosper and produced an offspring: coal-tar based chemistry. 
4.1. Steel 
The boom in steel manufacturing after 1870 was a direct consequence of the 
introduction of the Kelly-Bessemer process in 1856 and the Siemens-Martin pro- 
cess in 1864-1867. Together, these constituted a technological breakthrough of 
the first magnitude, despite their apparent simplicity. The Kelly-Bessemer pro- 
cess converted tonnage quantities of molten pig iron to mild (low-carbon) steel 
by blowing air through it. The exothermic heat generated by the rapid oxidation 
of the dissolved carbon sufficed to raise the temperature high enough to maintain 
the purified metal in a molten state suitable for pouring and casting. It was soon 
realized that the Kelly-Bessemer process was very difficult to control because of 
its rapidity. Fortuitously, the answer appeared immediately in the form of 
Robert Mushet's "spiegeleisenn (1856), a manganese-iron alloy that could be 
added to the hot metal to prevent excessive oxidation. However, early applica- 
tions of the Kelly-Bessemer process worked well only for pig iron made from 
low-phosphorus ores, a difficulty that was only finally overcome by the so-called 
basic version of the process developed by Sydney G. Thomas and Percy Gilchrist 
(1876). 
The Siemens-Martin process - in contrast with the fast, exothermic Kelly- 
Bessemer process - was a slower, endothermic (heat-absorbing) process of decar- 
burization whose success depended on an ingenious method of conserving waste 
heat (the regenerative furnace, 1856). There were two variants, William 
Siemens's "pig and oren process (1861) and Emilo and Pierre Martin's "pig and 
scrapn process (1864). Both were implemented within a few years. 
Rapid growth in steel production began after 1870, in both western Europe 
and the US. World production of iron in that year was 11.84 million tons, of 
which only 4.3% was converted to steel, mainly by the old crucible process. By 
1880 the figures for iron and steel were 18.16 and 4.18 million tons, respectively. 
Two decades later (1900) iron production more than doubled to 39.81 million 
tons, but steel output increased more than sixfold to 27.83 million tons. 
Meanwhile, steel prices fell sharply: Kelly-Bessemer steel rails had cost $170 per 
ton in 1867. By 1898 steel rails cost only $15 per ton. Prices stabilized 
thereafter, but growth trends slackened only slightly through the 1920s. Steel 
production actually exceeded pig iron output by 1920, and the proportion of steel 
to iron has continued to increase ever since (Figure 8). 
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Figure 8. Penetration of steel aa a percentage of all iron and steel products. 
4.2. Coal-tar chemistry and color 
The gaslight industry produced a major by-product: coal tar. In the UK this 
product was mostly used, at first, to caulk the hulls of ships and the like. How- 
ever, the Germans recognized an opportunity for developing products of higher 
value and began to support fundamental research on coal-tar chemistry at 
several institutions. The key discovery occurred in 1858 when a UK chemistry 
student, William H. Perkin, accidentally synthesized a brilliant purple color from 
aniline, a derivative of coal-tar, while searching for a way to synthesize quinine. 
He then proved it to be identical to the natural dye Umauve." Perkin saw the 
value of synthetic dye materials for the UK cotton industry, and began to 
manufacture the purple dye commercially. In the following year Perkin suc- 
ceeded in synthesizing a red dye, alizarin, the coloring agent in natural %ose 
madder." 
In the latter effort, however, Perkin was beaten (by a single day) by Ger- 
man chemists, Caro, Graebe, and Liebermann, who also synthesized alizarin and 
began production. Three big German firms, Badische Anilin und Soda Fabrik 
(BASF), Bayer, and Hoechst, were manufacturing dyes by 1870. Thereafter, the 
Germans gradually forged ahead, by investing heavily in research. More and 
more aniline-based dyes were introduced in the 18709 and 19809, culminating 
with a major triumph: the successful production of indigo by BASF in 1897. 
This remarkable firm also developed the successful contact process for manufac- 
turing sulfuric acid in the 1890s and began work on the most important single 
industrial chemical process of all time: the synthesis of ammonia from atmo- 
spheric nitrogen for use as a fertilizer to replace the natural sodium nitrates that 
were then being imported from Chile. The basic research was done at a univer- 
sity by Fritz Haber; the industrial process-development was led by Carl Bosch of 
BASF. The first laboratory-scale demonstration of the Haber-Bosch process was 
in 1909, but the process was shelved for a while due to the (temporarily) low 
price of a competing nitrogenous fertilizer, calcium cyanamide, made from cal- 
cium carbide. Finally, under the pressure of wartime shortages, a full-size plant 
began production of nitrates for fertilizers and munitions in 1916. 
However, the German chemical industry was predominantly based on syn- 
thetic dye manufacturing through the 19209. When the three biggest firms con- 
solidated (ca. 1925) they took the name I.G. Farbenindustrie. Farben is the Ger- 
man word for color. Indeed, it was experience with color chemistry that led to 
several major pharmaceutical breakthroughs (including the anti-syphilis drug 
Salvarsan) and helped the Germans take a leading role in color photography. 
4.3. Petroleum 
The gaslight industry was created ~rimarily to serve a growing demand for 
illumination. It could only do this in large cities where a central gas distribution 
system could be economically justified. However, in the 1850s most of the popu- 
lation of the world still lived in small towns or rural areas where gaslight was not 
an option. The alternative illuminants were liquid fuels: whale oil and kerosene. 
Whale oil was a cleaner-burning fuel and generally preferable, but the supply of 
whales from the oceans of the world was being depleted rapidly. Oil prices were 
rising. Kerosene could be produced in small quantities from coal, but petroleum 
was a far better source. 
The year 1857 marked the beginning of commercial petroleum production 
in Rumania, followed by the discovery of oil in western Pennsylvania in 1859. 
These developments were prompted by the introduction of distilled coal oil by 
James Young in 1850-1851 and kerosene in 1853. Interest was further stimu- 
lated by Benjamin Silliman's pioneering work on fractional distillation of 
petroleum (1855) and the rising price of liquid fuels such as kerosene and whale 
oil for household illumination. The subsequent availability of volatile hydrocar- 
bon liquids (natural gasoline, one of the lighter distillation products of 
petroleum) was crucial for the adaptation of Nikolaus Otto's stationary high- 
compression gas-burning internal-combustion engine to mobile transport pur- 
poses, discussed later. 
The growth of the petroleum industry in the US was extremely rapid. Pro- 
duction in 1860 was about 0.5 million barrels (bbl.). Output in the first decade 
of production multiplied tenfold to five million bbl. Production nearly doubled 
again by 1874 and once again by 1879 to 20 million bbl. Thereafter, output of 
crude oil reached 24 million bbl. in 1884, 35 million bbl. in 1889, 49 million bbl. 
in 1894, and 57 million bbl. in 1899 (Williamson and Daum, 1959). 
Throughout this period, the major product of the US petroleum industry 
was "illuminating oil" (much of which was exported to Europe). Other pro- 
ducts, in order of importance, included "naphtha-benzenegasoline," fuel oil (in 
the 1890s), lubricating oils, paraffin wax, and residuum (tar and bitumen). The 
gross value of refined products was about $43.7 million in 1880, $85 million in 
1889, and $124 million in 1899 (ibid.). Only the steel industry was bigger a t  that 
time. Employment in US refinery operations averaged 12,200 in 1899 (ibid.). It  
is important to bear in mind that this was a very large industry long before 
demand for motor gasoline became significant in the years after 1900. 
4.4. Sewing machines and bicycles 
The sewing machine was a natural follow-up to the cotton-spinning and cotton- 
weaving technology that was one of the drivers of the first technological transfor- 
mation, discussed in the previous section. However, cotton cloth is a bulk com- 
modity, whereas clothing must be customized to some extent. Thus, a skilled 
operator remained essential, and economies of scale in garment making were not 
nearly as great as in textile production. In other words, whereas a single loom 
could eventually be made very large and fast to  increase output, sewing 
machines were (and still are) needed in very large numbers. They were, also, 
inherently much more complex than any product produced in comparably large 
numbers (such as revolvers or pocket watches) up to the middle of the 
nineteenth century. 
The sewing machine was slow to reach the marketplace in practical form 
because of its mechanical complexity, as noted above, and because most inven- 
tors attempted to simulate the actions of a human seamstress, rather than taking 
advantage of the attributes of machines. The basic invention was the double 
pointed needle with an eye in the center, patented by Charles Weisenthal (1755). 
Actually, Thomas Saint came very close to inventing a practical sewing machine 
for leather work in 1790. His design lacked only Weisenthal's needle to antici- 
pate most of the features of much later models. But metalworking technology at  
the time was crude, so that Saint's machine would have been far too expensive 
for widespread use. A mechanical stitching machine was successfully demon- 
strated by Barthklemy Thimonnier in 1830, and 40 copies were made to produce 
uniforms for the French army. However, Thimonnier's machines were destroyed 
by a mob of angry tailors, and his project was aborted. 
The prototype of modern machines seems to have been built by Walter 
Hunt in 1832-1834, but it was not patented. Again, the machine was probably 
too complex to manufacture at  that time. Hunt's ideas were independently 
rediscovered and patented by Elias Howe (1846). During the next decade many 
other inventors introduced useful improvements, or reintroduced the same ideas 
independently. Some of the names are Morey, Johnson, Bachelder, Blodgett, 
Lerow, Wilson, Grover, and Baker. Of course the most famous name is that of 
Isaac Singer, whose 1851 machine was noted more for its successful combination 
of the important features of a modern sewing machine, than for its originality. A 
patent pool (1856) resolved most of the furious disputes over priority and gave 
Howe some royalties. 
Production began on a modest scale in the early 1850s. The market was 
ready, and demand soared. Annual production reached 110,000 in the US alone 
by 1860 and continued to grow for decades thereafter. However, 1860 probably 
marked the point of maximum diversity. In that year there were 74 different 
manufacturers. In the following decade, as  the product standardized, three of 
them began to outdistance the competition, and Singer took the lead. 
At first the sewing-machine industry was a small outgrowth of the arms- 
and tool-making industry located in New England. Most early machines were 
built under contract by arms makers or machine shops. Specialized factories 
were built as early as 1858. In 1873, Singer built a new, vertically integrated 
manufacturing facility in Elizabethport, NJ, and revolutionized manufacturing. 
It was in that plant - between 1880 and 1882 - that the elusive goal of inter- 
changeable parts was first fully realized by a mass-producer (Hounshell, 1984, p. 
92). 
Another important consumer product innovation toward the end of the 
nineteenth century was the bicycle. Its predecessors include a number of 
machines that were built by individual enthusiasts, such as Johnson (ca. 1818), 
MacMillan (ca. 1840), and Dalzell (1846). However, the rotary crank did not 
appear until 1865 on the first commercial velocipede, made in small numbers by 
M. Michaux from Paris. The Franco-Prussian War (1870) interrupted Mi- 
chaux's business and moved the infant bicycle industry to the UK. The veloci- 
pede was soon imitated and improved upon by James Starley and William Hill- 
man. Further innovations included the substitution of hard rubber tires (ca. 
1870) and ball bearings (1877). The gear-and-sprocket drive was invented in 
1879 by Harry J. Lawson and introduced on the "safety bicycle" manufactured 
on a large scale by J.K. Starley's Rover Company starting in 1885. The final 
major improvement was pneumatic rubber tires, the invention of John Dunlop 
(1889). Dunlop went on to manufacture automobile tires. Freewheeling (for 
coasting) and variable gears were introduced in 1894 and 1899, respectively. 
The bicycle industry enjoyed a great but brief boom in 1892-1894. It is 
worth a mention here mainly because bicycle technology was a vital prerequisite 
of the automobile and the airplane. For instance, early automobiles employed 
bicycle-type wheels, tubular steel frames, ball bearings, and chain-and-sprocket 
drives. Aircraft bodies also utilized lightweight construction techniques 
pioneered in bicycles. Wilbur and Orville Wright, the first men to build a suc- 
cessful powered aircraft, had worked previously in a bicycle shop, as did Charles 
and Frank Duryea, the first Americans to build a gasoline-powered automobile, 
and W.S. Knudsen, who later became president of General Motors. In fact 
several major automobile companies began as bicycle manufacturers, including 
Peugeot (France), Ope1 (Germany), Hillman, Morris, and Rover (UK), and 
Pope, Winton, and Willys (USA). 
4.5. Internal-combustion engine 
The second great technological breakthrough of this period was the gasoline 
powered internal-combustion engine. It, too, was in a sense an outgrowth of the 
gaslight industry, in the sense that the availability of "town gasn as a fuel was a 
prerequisite. But the driving force behind this innovation was the need for more 
compact and more efficient prime movers, especially for the smaller machine 
shops and factories that were springing up. Nikolaus Otto's successful high- 
compression gas engine (1876) was the culmination of a series of inventions. 
Some of the most noteworthy were the prototype "explosion enginesn of R. 
Street in 1794 and W. Cecil in 1820 and the first commercial stationary gas 
engines built by Samuel Brown in the 1820s and 1830s. 
Key steps forward were taken by Wright (1833) and William Barnett 
(1838), who were the first to try to use compression. Etienne Lenoir (1860) built 
and commercialized a double-acting gas engine modeled on the double-acting 
steam engine invented by James Watt. Like Watt's engine, it did not compress 
the fuel-air mixture. These engines were quite successful, despite being very 
inefficient in thermodynamic terms (about 4%). 
The need to compress the fuel-air mixture prior to ignition had been recog- 
nized by Barnett, but the first to use compression in a two-stroke engine was 
George Brayton in 1872. His engine was exhibited at  the "Century of Progressn 
in Philadelphia, 1876. The superior four-stroke cycle was described in theory by 
Alphonse Beau de Rochas (1862). This cycle was embodied in Otto's revolution- 
ary engine 14 years later. The "Silent Otton rapidly achieved commercial suc- 
cess as a stationary power source for small establishments throughout Europe, 
burning illuminating gas as a fuel. Otto's engine produced three hp at 180 revo- 
lutions per minute (rpm) and weighed around 1,500 lb., a much more compact 
package than any comparable steam engine. 
The first "truen automobile engine was probably a 1.5 hp (600 rpm) model 
weighing 110 lb. built by Gottlieb Daimler (who had worked for Otto) and 
Wilhelm Maybach (1885). They built four experimental vehicles during the 
years 1885-1889. The first true (if impractical) automobile was built and 
operated for several years by Siegfried Markus (1864-1868) and shown at the 
Vienna Exposition in 1873. Karl Benz, an established manufacturer of (station- 
ary) internal-combustion engines, motorized a tricycle in 1886. This is some 
times credited as the first practical automobile. Credit for that achievement 
probably belongs more properly to Emile Levassor in 1891, who designed the 
first car (the Panhard-Levassor) that did not resemble a horsedrawn carriage 
without the horse. Benz introduced the spark plug, however, a significant 
advance over Otto's "glow tuben ignition. A large number of subsidiary inven- 
tions followed, such as the carburetor (Maybach, 1893), the expanding brake 
(the Duryea brothers, 1898), the steering wheel (1901), the steering knuckle 
(Eliot, 1902), the headlamp, and the self-starter (Kettering, 1912). 
Incidentally, the success of the spark-ignition high-compression "Otto 
cyclen engine created enormous interest in the technical possibilities of compres- 
sion engines and led directly to the development of the compression-ignition 
internal-combustion engine by Rudolph Diesel (patented 1892). The diesel 
engine was first commercialized for stationary power in 1898, but acceptance was 
slow. It was adopted for the first time for railway use by the Prussian State 
Railways (1912) and for marine use shortly thereafter. However, large-scale rail- 
way use began in the 1930s (General Motors). The first automobile diesel engine 
was introduced in the 1930s by Mercedes Benz, but penetration of the automo- 
bile market has been negligible until recently. (The advent of the turbo diesel 
has changed this somewhat.) However, diesel power dominates the heavy truck, 
bus, rail, and off-road machinery fields today. 
The most important technological barrier that stood in the way of practical 
self-powered road vehicles, from the time of Nicholas Cugnot (1770) on, was the 
unavailability of a prime mover with sufficient power in a small enough package. 
The same barrier applied to heavier-than-air craft. The key variable is power- 
to-weight ratio. In retrospect it is clear that the minimum feasible level for road 
vehicles was about 100 lb. per hp or .O1 hp per lb. The Daimler-Maybach engine 
achieved 75 lb. per hp or .0133 hp per lb. Cars did not become truly practical 
until further developments brought the engine weight down (or the power up) to 
around 15 lb. per hp. Figure 9 shows the progression in power output per unit 
weight. 
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Figure 9. Mobile power per unit weight. 
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Actually, the 1901 Mercedes Benz engine produced 35 hp with an engine 
weighing 475 lb. (13.5 Ib. per hp). But Charles Manly's engine, designed 
specifically for Samuel Langley's Aerodrome (1903), achieved 52 hp in a package 
weighing only 150 lb. or less than three lb. per hp. But the early aircraft engines 
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obtained part of their punch by the use of special high-octane fuels (e.g., ben- 
zene) that permitted high-compression ratios - and hence greater power - but 
that could not be produced in large enough quantities for automotive use. Obvi- 
ously practical air transportation (which came much later) required substantially 
reducing the weight of the engines. Progress in gasoline-refining technology in 
the 19309 played a major role in this. 
4.6. Electric light and power 
The third great technological breakthrough of the 1880s was the commercializa- 
tion of direct current (DC) electrical generation, primarily for lighting and 
streetcar systems, initiated in the US and followed soon after in western Europe. 
The key inventions were the efficient DC dynamo (and its alter ego, the DC 
motor), the arc lamp, and the incandescent light. The dynam-and-motor 
evolved over many years, following Michael Faraday's initial discovery of elec- 
tromagnetic induction in 1831. The major milestones were made by Europeans, 
with significant contributions from John Stephen Woolrich (1842), Fredrick Hale 
Holmes (1857), Charles Wheatstone (1845, 1857), Werner Siemens (1856, 1866), 
Antonio Pacinotti (1860), ZCnobie ThCophile Gramme (1870), and F. von 
Hefner-Altaneck (1872) (Sharlin, 1961). Gramme's machine was the first capable 
of producing a relatively continuous current. Von Hefner-Altaneck (of the Sie- 
mens firm) perfected the drum winding, which was more efficient and cheaper, 
and has subsequently become the standard. The prevailing engineering doctrine 
up to 1878 was to produce large amounts of current for arc lamps at low vol- 
tages. The most widely used commercial dynamo before Edison (Gramme) 
achieved an efficiency of barely 40% in terms of converting mechanical energy to 
electrical energy. Indeed, at the time, 50% was thought to be the theoretical 
upper limit! (Josephson, 1959). The only significant application of dynamo elec- 
tricity until the 1880s was for arc lamps, and only on a small scale. 
Thomas A. Edison's decision in 1877 to develop a practical incandescent 
lamp suitable for household and office use (in competition with the gaslight), was 
momentous. He was the first to realize that the solution was to be found in 
much higher voltages, to minimize the need for copper wire in the distribution 
system (ibid.). This required a new generator design and led to his constant- 
voltage bipolar generator (1878), which raised the efficiency of energy conversion 
in one giant step to 90% (ibid.). This made possible Edison's system of central 
station electricity production and distribution (1882) and opened the door for 
widespread applications of DC electricity. The progression of efficiency is shown 
in Figure 10. 
The first new application of DC power was for lighting. Arc lamps were 
already known, and a number of practical arc-lighting systems were developed in 
the late 1870s - preeminantly those of Charles Brush (1876) and Elihu Thomson 
with Edwin Houston (1878). These systems were suitable for outside use and 
large public rooms. Soon they were being produced in significant numbers. By 
1881 an estimated 6,000 arc lamps were in service in the US, supplied by their 
own dynamos. Edison's high-voltage carbon-filament incandescent light (1879) 
t & Dynamo-electric, drum winding - Dynamo-electric, ring winding 
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Figure 10. Efficiency of electric generators: electric power output per unit of mechani- 
cal power input. 
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was more suited for indoor use, of course, and it, too, went into production in 
1881 - both by Edison7s company and by several competitors. Both types of 
lighting system met rapidly growing demand. By 1885 the number of arc lamps 
in service was 96,000 and the number of incandescent lights had already reached 
250,000. By 1890 these numbers had risen to 235,000 and 3 million, respectively. 
Edison's success was bad news for the gaslight industry. After a long 
period of prosperous growth, gas shares slumped sharply in the late 1880s, which 
may have contributed to the recession of the early 1890s. As it happened, the 
gaslight system was temporarily reprieved by the invention of the "gas mantlen 
by Carl Auer von Welsbach in 1885. The incandescent thoria-ceria mantle 
increased the luminosity of a gas flame by a factor of six (Passer, 1953, p. 196), 
and its adoption kept gas lighting competitive for another 20 years. The electric 
light was adopted much more rapidly in the US than it was in the UK, primarily 
because gas was much cheaper in the UK, making electricity much less competi- 
tive for purposes of lighting in the 1890s. This, together with restrictive legisla- 
tion, seriously impeded UK development in the competitive electrical industry. 
Other applications of DC power soon followed, of which the most notable 
in terms of immediate impact was the electric streetcar (or trolley), which sprang 
up more or less independently in a number of cities. The contributions of 
Charles Van De Poele (especially the carbon brush, 1888) and Frank Sprague, 
who built the first practical heavy duty DC motors suitable for electric trams, 
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deserve particular mention. The building of urban transit systems not only 
employed a good many people, but also permanently influenced urban geogra- 
phy, permitting much higher-density development than had previously been pos- 
sible, as well as creating many new suburbs. A remarkable number of street rail- 
ways (trolleys) were built in the following decade. As noted above, by 1910 it 
was said to be possible to travel by trolley from Maine to Wisconsin. 
By 1890 DC power was already being challenged by alternating current 
(AC) for general distribution. To supply electricity in large amounts economi- 
cally it was (and is) necessary to take advantage of economies of scale in produc- 
tion, whether from available hydr-power sources or from large steam-powered 
generating plants. In the US an obvious initial location for a large generating 
plant was Niagara Falls, which was some distance from the major centers of 
industry. In Europe, the first hydroelectric generating plants had to be located 
on tributaries of the Rhone, Rhine, and Danube, mostly in remote Alpine val- 
leys. To serve a dispersed population of users from a central source, an efficient 
means of transmission was needed, and efficient (i.e., low-loss) transmission 
inherently requires high voltages. 
AC power can be transformed easily from low to high voltages, and back, 
but DC power cannot. This simple technical fact dictated the eventual outcome. 
All that was needed was the requisite technology for generating and transmitting 
AC power a t  high voltages. Thomson had already developed a practical AC gen- 
erator (1881). Lucien Gaulard and John Dixon Gibbs, in Europe, and Elihu 
Thomson and William Stanley, in the US, had developed prototype transmission 
and distribution systems for AC incandescent light by 1885. Nikola Tesla intr- 
duced the polyphase system, which in turn permitted the AC induction ("squir- 
rel cagen) motor by 1888. 
The entrepreneur who saw the potential of AC power, acquired licenses to 
all the patents of Gaulard, Gibbs, Stanley, and Tesla, and "put it all togethern 
was George Westinghouse. His success was assured by a successful bid for the 
first phase of the Niagara Falls generating plant (1891) and, subsequently, the 
great Chicago Exhibition (1893). It was Tesla, incidentally, who persuaded 
Westinghouse to establish the 60-cycle standard for AC, which ultimately 
became universal in the US. 
Yet Edison, the father of DC power, strongly resisted the development and 
use of AC systems (as Watt, before him, had resisted the use of high-pressure 
steam). During the 1880s both the Edison companies and the Thomson-Houston 
companies had been growing rapidly and swallowing up competing (or comple- 
mentary) smaller firms, such as Brush Electric, Van De Poele, and Sprague. In 
1892 the two electric-lighting and traction conglomerates merged to form the 
General Electric Co. (GE), with combined sales of $21 million, as  compared with 
$5 million for Westinghouse. In the mid-1890s the two firms fought hundreds of 
lawsuits over patent rights; this problem was finally resolved by creation of a 
patent pool, which gave GE 63% and Westinghouse 37% of the combined royal- 
ties for 15 years. The main benefit of this arrangement was that neither incom- 
patible standards nor patent restrictions held back further technological progress 
of electricity, as might otherwise have happened. In the end, AC displaced DC 
for most purposes, as it was bound to do. 
The first sharp burst of the electric light and power industry in the US dur- 
ing the 1880s slowed to a crawl during the early 18908, due to the recession men- 
tioned above and the uncertainty with regard to the DC-AC controversy. In any 
case, GE's revenues slumped sharply after 1893 and did not reach the 1893 level 
again until 1898. Rapid growth in the electrification of factories and households 
occurred thereafter, as indicated by Figure 11. This was accompanied by rapid 
growth in the manufacture of electrical equipment and the associated electrical 
utilities in the early decades of the twentieth century. 
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Figure 11. Electrification in the US. (Source: USBOC, Historical Statistics of the Unit- 
ed States.)  
4.7. Electrochemistry and electrometallurgy 
Two new and important applications of electric power also appeared during the 
1890s, viz., electrometallurgy and electrochemistry. The high-temperature elec- 
tric arc furnace, invented by William Siemens in 1878, was first used commer- 
cially by Alfred and Eugene Cowles in 1886 to manufacture aluminum alloys. 
The discovery of the use of acetylene as an illuminating gas by Henri Moissan in 
1892 was a milestone. In the same year T.L. Willson demonstrated a method of 
producing acetylene from calcium carbide made in an electric furnace. Acetylene 
was rapidly adopted as an illuminant for towns without electricity. By 1899 a 
million acetylene gas jets were fed by 8,000 acetylene plants in Germany alone 
(Burke, 1978, p. 209). The boom collapsed almost as rapidly, due to the impact 
of the Welsbach mantle and cheaper electricity. Acetylene continued as a very 
important industrial chemical feedstock, however, until its displacement by 
ethylene (from natural gas) in the 1930s. 
Another early application of electric furnaces was the discovery (Edward 
Acheson, 1891) and production of synthetic silicon carbide ("carborundumn). 
This was the hardest material known at  the time, apart from diamonds, and 
found immediate use as an abrasive used by the rapidly growing metal-working 
industry, especially in secalled production grinding machines developed by 
Charles Norton in 1900. The vital importance of high-speed grinding machines 
to the mass production of automobiles has already been mentioned. It is 
noteworthy that modern grinding technology is dependent on the prior develop- 
ment of the electric furnace, and could not otherwise have been developed. 
The research of Moissan in France in the late 1890s also led to the use of 
the electric furnace for melting metals with high melting points, such as 
chromium, molybdenum, nickel, platinum, tungsten, and vanadium. Paul L.T. 
Hdroult further developed the electric furnace for industrial purposes, and his 
work was instrumental in permitting its use for the production of ferroalloys and 
special steels, beginning in Canada after 1903. The importance of abrasives (for 
grinding) and special tool steels and hard materials, such as tungsten carbide, is 
illustrated by .Figure 12 in terms of metalworking rates. 
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Figure 18. Machining speed (productivity) for steel axle: machining time and permissi- 
ble cutting speed. 
Electrochemistry - the application of electrolysis - also became practical 
for industrial use in the 1880s. The first, and most important, industrial electro- 
lytic process was discovered in 1887 independently by Hdroult in France and by 
Charles A.M. Hall in the US. They each developed a practical way of producing 
aluminum from aluminum oxide (alumina) dissolved in molten cryolite. This 
process was commercially exploited in both countries within two years. The 
price of aluminum dropped rapidly (from $17 per lb. in the 1860s to $8 per lb. in 
the 1880s to $.30 per lb. by 1897). Not surprisingly, many new applications 
emerged. 
Curiously, the availability of metallic aluminum had no real impact on the 
infant aircraft industry in its first three decades, i.e., until about 1927 when the 
first all-metal plane (Ford Tri-motor) was built. Needless to say, the commercial 
airline industry, in its present form, could not exist without aluminum. 
The second important electrolytic process (1888) was Hamilton Castner's 
system for manufacturing metallic sodium (and chlorine) from fused sodium 
chloride, or common salt. At first, it was sodium hydroxide that was the impor- 
tant product - used in making soap and for whitening illuminating oil - and 
chlorine was more or less a by-product. However, chlorine was soon in demand 
for a variety of chemical purposes, as well as for bleaching paper and purifying 
municipal drinking water. Today, chlorine is one of the most important basic 
industrial materials, with a host of important uses from plastics (e.g., polyvinyl 
chloride) to insecticides (beginning with DDT). The cumulative economic 
impact of electrometallurgy and electrochemistry has clearly been enormous, 
although most of it was not felt until many years after the key innovations. 
4.8. Telephone 
One last great tecl~nological breakthrough of the period must also be noted. The 
telephone (Alexander Graham Bell, 1876) actually preceded Edison's break- 
through in DC power, and its advances occurred, auring the early stages, 
independently of it. Nevertheless, the telephone system in its present form is 
entirely dependent on the availa.bility of inexpensive, reliable electric power in 
large amounts. Precursors of the telephone were, primarily, the telegraph 
(Charles Wheatstone, 1837; Samuel F.B. Morse, 1844) and its later improve- 
ments. The key invention, by some accounts the most valuable of all time, was - 
to some extent - serendipitous. Bell's backers were merely seeking to increase 
the capacity of the telegraph system, which was having difficulty expanding its 
network fast enough to accommodate growing demand. The original invention 
was the practical implementation of the notion that speech could be transmitted 
and reproduced as an "undulatory electric current of varying frequency." Others 
had previously worked on the idea of transmitting speech by wire, notably 
Charles Bourseul (1854) and Philip Reis (1861), but had adhered too closely to 
the make-or-break principle of the telegraph. 
In any case, Bell's invention was soon followed by the creation of a business 
enterprise (American Bell Telephone Co.), which grew with incredible rapidity. 
Manufacturing began under license within a year, and 5,600 phones had been 
produced by the end of 1877. In 1878, the first commercial switchboard was 
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Figure 13. Household electrification: percent of households. 
operating in New Haven, with 21 subscribers. Telephone companies sprang up 
in almost every town and city, not only in the US but also in western Europe. 
The annual rate of US production rose to 67,000 by 1880 (of which 16,000 were 
exported), and the number of units in the hands of licensed Bell agents in the US 
alone reached 132,692 as of 20 February 1881 (Smith, 1985, p. 161). The 
number nearly doubled two years later. The Bell licensees gradually evolved 
into local operating companies. Western Electric Company was acquired by 
American Bell in 1881 to become its manufacturing arm, and AT&T was formed 
to operate longlines interconnecting the local companies. AT&T gradually 
acquired stock in many of the operating companies and subsequently exchanged 
its stock with American Bell, becoming the parent company. 
It should be noted that Bell's original patent, while the most essential, was 
only the first step in a massive technological enterprise. Telephony has spawned 
literally tens of thousands of inventions, some of them very important. One of 
the first and most important was the carbon microphone invented by Edison and 
Emile Berliner (1877). Many of the key inventions in sound reproduction, elec- 
tronic circuitry, and radio were by-products of an intensive exploration of ways 
to reduce costs and improve the effectiveness of telephone service. There were 
47,900 phones actually in service at the end of 1880, 155,800 by the end of 1885, 
227,900 by the end of 1890, and 339,500 by the end of 1895. The original Bell 
patent expired in 1894, releasing a burst of activity. US demand skyrocketed: a 
million phones were added to the system in the next five years, 2.8 million in the 
period 1905-1910, and 3.5 million in the period 1910-1915. The US industry 
grew much faster than its European counterpart after 1895 (having lagged some- 
what behind Sweden and Switzerland earlier). Penetration is shown in Figure 
13. 
Employment generated by the telephone system has not been estimated, 
but was probably not less than one per hundred telephones in service. By 1900, 
Western Electric Co. employed 8,500 people and had sales of $16 million; by 
1912 it was the third largest manufacturing firm in the world, with annual sales 
of $66 million. The telephone system could not have grown nearly so fast or so 
large without the concomitant availability of electric power. 
An offshoot of the telephone (and another application of electricity) must 
now be mentioned, viz., radiotelegraphy developed by Guglielmo Marconi in 
1896. However, the technology was very limited at first, and its applications 
remained few and specialized for the next two decades, or more. They belong to 
the fourth technological transformation. 
4.9. Automobiles 
The automobile was not really a single invention (although it was patented 
several times), but rather a convergence or fusion of many inventions. Precondi- 
tions for a successful self-powered vehicle included an adequate engine, fuel, 
means of transmitting power to the wheels, means of controlling the engine and 
the vehicle itself, a suspension, a chassis or frame, suitable materials of construc- 
tion, and efficient manufacturing techniques. Although steam power was sporad- 
ically adapted to propel road vehicles throughout the nineteenth century (and 
actually dominated automobile racing as late as 1906), it was the high-speed 
spark-ignition gasoline engine of Daimler and Maybach (1885) that uniquely met 
the first criterion. Gasoline was available for fuel, initially as a by-product of the 
fast-growing illuminating-oil industry. Cheap, high-quality steel used for bicycle 
frames, gears, and chains and pneumatic tires were important contributors. New 
manufacturing techniques, invented partly for the auto industry, completed the 
picture. Some of the tools developed for the new industry were a remarkable col- 
lection of new machines for precision grinding of crankshafts (1903), piston rings 
(1904), cylinders (1905), and camshafts (191 1). Ford's rationalization of the 
assembly process, culminating in the moving assembly line (1913-1916), while 
hardly an original concept, also deserves mention.[2] 
In 1900 some 8,000 motor vehicles were registered in the US, and produc- 
tion that year was 4,192 units. Production rose rapidly to 33,200 units in 1906, 
181,000 in 1910, and no less than 1.5 million in 1916. The 3.2 million level was 
reached in 1924, rising to a (temporary) peak of 4.6 million in 1929. This aston- 
ishing growth carried with it a number of satellite industries, ranging from gas* 
line refining and tire manufacturing to storage batteries and safety-glass. It also 
brought about significant changes in the technology of manufacturing. 
However, the major historical accomplishment of Henry Ford was more 
far-reaching, if less technical. By bringing together many innovations of others, 
he made automobile transportation cheap, reliable, and accessible to all. What 
had been a luxury for the rich in 1905 was becoming a household (and farm) 
necessity only 20 years later. The 1909 Model T sold for $950 (Hounshell, 1984, 
p. 224). The average annual wage of a US worker in that year was $545. By 
1916 the price of a Ford was down to $360, whereas the average wage was up to 
$705. In the early 1920s Ford brought the price down even further (to retain 
market share) to $290 (Abernathy, 1978, p. 32). By comparison, the average 
annual wage in the last year of the Model T (1927) was $1,380. An average US 
worker in 1908 would need to work 21 months to buy a car. By 1927 the average 
worker could buy a car with the wages of 2.5 month's work. (No wonder many 
chose to spend more money and buy a more upto-date car!) Ford did nothing 
less than create the mass consumption society. 
4.10. Photography and moving pictures 
Photography - the making and recording of visual images by physicochemical 
means - is not a single well-defined technology. The earliest experimental 
discoveries on photochemistry (especially the light sensitivity of silver com- 
pounds) date back at  least to 1727 (J.H. Schulze). The optical prerequisites for 
cameras are even older. The camera obscura was invented in 1553, if not earlier, 
and the use of lenses, shutters, and mirrors to sharpen the image was established 
before 1600. Thus the means of fixing an image on some permanent medium was 
the major barrier to practical use. The first permanent photographic image (on 
glass) is attributed to Joseph Nicephore Niepce (1822). Means of fixing an image 
on a metal plate followed in 1826 and attracted the notice of Louis J.M. 
Daguerre. Daguerre joined Niepce in 1829, and 10 more years of development 
resulted in the daguerrotype process (iodized silver plate, fixed by mercury 
fumes), which was a commercial success. Nevertheless, it required an exposure 
of 4,000 seconds to obtain a good image ( f / l l )  in sunlight. This was cut to 80 
seconds a year later by resensitizing the plate with bromine. 
The process of making "positiven reproductions from a "negativen image 
was invented by W.H. Fox Talbot (UK) in 1840. A new material, collodion (a 
stabilized form of cellulose nitrate) was developed as a by-product of the search 
for more effective explosives conducted by Christian Schoenbein in 1847. The 
wet plate collodion process developed by Fred Scott Archer in 1851 superceded 
the daguerrotype and increased sensitivity another tenfold. The next step was to 
coat plates with an emulsion of silver bromide in collodion advanced by B.J. 
Sayce and W.B. Bolton in 1864 and by Bolton alone in 1874. Sensitivity 
improved further with the introduction by C. Russell in 1862 of alkaline develop- 
ment, but this was not perfected until the advent of gelatino-silver bromide dry 
plates, which increased sensitivity by another factor of 16 by 1880 and a further 
factor of five by 1885. By this time exposure time was down to 1/10 of a second. 
Progress has continued rapidly since then: 1/100 of a second was achieved by 
1930, 11500 by 1950, and 112,500 by 1960 (Figure I d ) .  
The substitution of roll film for glass plates, which vastly increased the 
market for photography, was the contribution of George Eastman (1884), and 
the first roll film (Kodak) camera was marketed by Eastman in 1888. This was 
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Figure 14. Technological progress in photographic imaging: normalized to f / l l ,  full 
sun, and black and white. 
the start of the Eastman Kodak Company. A new flexible nitrocellulose-based 
(celluloid) film was introduced by Hannibal Goodwin in 1888 and produced by 
Eastman in 1889. Edison's contributions to sound recording (the recording tele- 
graph and the phonograph, 1877) attracted his interest to moving pictures. 
Edweard Muybridge's "zoopraxiscopen (1879) was the first system for rapid 
sequential photography. Edison applied it to the new flexible film and invented 
his kinetoscope (1893) for playing a strip of successive time-delayed images, 
using a stroboscopic light and a hole-and-sprocket system for pulling the film. 
The final idea of projecting the images continuously on a screen was patented by 
brothers L.J. and A.M.L.N. Lumikre (1895). The silent movie became popular 
almost overnight thereafter. However, it became a great economic success only 
in the decades after 1930 when sound and later color were added. 
4.11. Conclusion 
It is clear that the simple well-defined clustering of critical innovations that 
occurred near the years 1775 and 1825, and kicked off the first two Kondratieff 
waves, did not repeat with the third technological transformation, ca. 1875. A 
far more complex pattern ensued. The third wave of growth was characterized 
by no less than five distinct leading sectors, which did not coincide exactly. The 
first two were the steel industry and the petroleum industry. The next three, 
which were displaced by about 20 years, were telephones, electric light and 
power, and automobiles. (Indeed, still other industries, such as industrial chemi- 
cals and agricultural machinery, could well have been included.) 
The time displacement was hardly accidental. It has been pointed out that 
a highly developed steel industry was a prerequisite for both the electric power 
industry and the auto industry. A sophisticated petroleum refining industry was 
also a prerequisite for autos. Lastly, electric power was a prerequisite for both 
telephones and products using the electric furnace, which, again, were a prere- 
quisite for the high-speed grinding technology that made truly large-scale aut* 
mobile manufacturing economically feasible. 
Another difference between the third transformation and the first two is 
that the role of labor-saving (or time-saving, labor-extending) technologies 
appears to have been significantly increased. This characterization applies to 
telecommunications, electric light, and electric traction, for instance. It also 
applies to a variety of kitchen and household appliances, such as the sewing 
machine, and to agricultural machines, such as the harvester, which were not 
explicitly discussed. The internal-combustion engine (ICE), the steam turbine, 
and factory electrification are examples of innovations that conserved energy. 
Capital was also saved, if the capital invested in the central generating and dis- 
tribution system can be allocated to all users. Petroleum refining was, in effect, 
a resource-extending innovation. The use of steel rails in place of iron rails was 
also an energy-saving innovation, inasmuch as steel rails lasted much longer than 
their iron counterparts. To the extent that they permitted heavier trains and 
higher speeds, they also conserved (or extended) capital. 
Many of the key innovations of the third technological transformation can- 
not well be characterized by any of the above labels, inasmuch as they really 
offered new services to consumers, either directly or indirectly (as in the case of 
new materials). The boundary between labor-extending innovations and new 
services needs clarification. Gaslight and the electric light are labor extending 
insofar as they facilitate production. They are new services insofar as they 
increase the quality of life for consumers. This is true of the electric streetcar, 
the telegraph, the telephone, the bicycle, and many household appliances. as 
well. The automobile (and its relative, the truck) also can be counted under 
both headings today, though the private car was mainly a luxury - except for 
farmers - until the 1950s. 
5. The Fourth Technological Transformation ca. 1930-1950 
If the initial 50-year cycle had continued on schedule the fourth major cluster of 
innovations should have occurred earlier than it did, viz., ca. 1925. In actuality, 
there seems to have been a slowdown in the rate of major innovations during the 
period that economic growth accelerated, 1895-1930, and a speedup only after 
1930. If what occurred during the period 1930-1950 can be called a cluster, it 
was certainly delayed and spread out over many innovations of smaller magni- 
tude. There were just three truly significant innovations: television, semicon- 
ductors, and the computer. 
Three possible explanations for the pattern are obvious. First, the previous 
growth phase was stretched out considerably by the sequential development of 
five leading sectors (steel and petroleum, followed by electric power, telephones, 
and automobiles). Second, four of the major growth sectors of the previous cen- 
tury reached or passed maturity: textiles, railways, gaslight, and coal mining; 
this diluted the impact of the new growth sectors. Third, World War I1 inter- 
vened. It may be argued, indeed, that the war actually accelerated innovation, 
rather than impeded it. This certainly appears to be true in some instances, 
such as radar, jet engines, atomic energy, and computers. However, the reverse 
may be true in others such as synthetic fibers and television. The net effect of 
the war will have to be sorted out by others. 
An additional point that cannot be dismissed lightly is the suspicion that 
the Great Depression was a historical accident. Far from being the inevitable 
consequence of a long period of growth that occurred too rapidly, it may well 
have been, instead, the result of human error: a panicky misinterpretation of the 
umessagen from the great stock market crash of October 1929.[3] According to 
some current neeKeynesian theorists it was the actions of the government, not 
the stock market, that converted a normal cyclic recession into a major disaster. 
If the human error interpretation of events is anywhere near correct, the 
Great Depression was not the inevitable result of long-wave dynamics. In other 
words, had it not been for the misguided actions of the Hoover administration, 
the long surge of consumer-driven economic growth that began in 1890 might 
have continued for another decade or two, if not longer. Certainly neither the 
trend toward uautomobilizationn nor the electrification of households had run its 
course by 1930; in fact, the latter t a d  barely begun. Yet both trends were inter- 
rupted for nearly two decades. 
Whereas a new set of leading sectors appeared in the 1870s and 1980s, the 
primary leading sector of the 1930-1950s was, once again, the automobile indus- 
try and its satellites. In fact, as seen in retrospect, the diffusion of the automo- 
bile throughout society had scarcely begun by 1930. Satellites of the auto indus- 
try included the petroleum industry (which had to switch from supplying 
illuminating oil to supplying motor fuel) and the highway construction industry 
(and its suppliers, such as cement and steel). The electrical industry also 
benefited from the growth of the auto industry. It began by selling spark plugs 
and magnetos to the auto manufacturers, and subsequently provided starter 
motors, headlights, batteries, instruments, and finally a whole galaxy of elec- 
tronic controls. Today's automobiles contain thousands of electrical and elec- 
tronic components, and the ratio of value added by electrical to mechanical parts 
continues to rise. Indeed, microprocessors now control many of the important 
subsystems of the car, including (in some models) fuel injection and brakes. 
The electrical industry entered the twentieth century as a capital goods 
supplier with one major consumer product: light bulbs. By mid-century the 
emphasis had begun to shift to making a wide range of consumer products (apart 
from components for automobiles), both for saving household labor and for 
entertainment. Electronics and telecommunications began to converge. Growth 
in induced demand for electricity was, of course, a natural consequence. 
To this list of leading sectors, the chemical industry and the aircraft- 
aerospace sectors should be added. Several important new sub-industries, 
including synthetic fibers, synthetic rubber, plastics, and pharmaceuticals, were 
really spawned by chemical technology. It is certainly noteworthy that the com- 
mercial airline industry took off in the depths of the Great Depression of the 
1930s, although the rapid growth (diffusion) era began in the 1950s. 
It was noted above that a large number of household electric appliances 
were either first introduced or vastly improved after 1930. The electric refrigera- 
tor was first commercialized in the US. The refrigerator was based on a French 
design developed in 1911, but it was GE's 'monitor top," introduced in 1928, 
that began the era of rapid growth, which actually accelerated during the 1930s 
(Figure 19). The first electric washing machine appeared in 1912, but the con- 
venient automatic washer arrived in 1939. An electric range (of sorts) was intro- 
duced as early as 1906, but the modern "whiteenamel" version appeared in 
1930, along with the electric clock. The first electric dishwasher also appeared in 
1930; it became automatic in 1954. The room air conditioner followed in 1932, 
the garbage disposal in 1935, the electric blanket in 1936, and the fluorescent 
light in 1938. Of course, in all these cases the growth rate accelerated sharply 
after World War I1 as these innovations diffused throughout the US economy 
and then the European economy. 
Was there really a major technological transformation beginning around 
1930? From a very long-term perspective - notwithstanding the glamor of rock- 
ets, supersonic planes, and nuclear weapons - the answer is unclear. One major 
change was the institutionalization of R&D and the largescale participation of 
governments to finance it. Because of the so-called 'miracle drugs," the atomic 
bomb, the space program, and the computer, the public has become more aware 
of the power of technology to change the lives of people than (perhaps) it was 
earlier. Doubtless for this reason it is often asserted that technology in recent 
decades has been changing more rapidly than ever before. The reality is prob- 
ably otherwise. Nevertheless, the postwar era witnessed 20 years of the fastest 
economic growth in US history. This growth was based on many innovations, to 
be sure, but few (except the transistor and the electronic computer, whose major 
impact was later) could be termed revolutionary. 
5.1. Chemicals: petrochemicals, synthetic fibers, plastics, 
a n d  pharmaceuticals [4] 
The innovations that accompanied the fourth transformation were many in 
number but individually less important in relative terms than some of the earlier 
ones. There were, for instance, thousands of new chemicals and new processes to 
produce them. The chemical industry actually took off in the last decades of the 
nineteenth century, based on synthetic dyes, and gradually moved into other 
fields. The powerful German chemical industry of today had its origins in those 
earlier decades. 
The synthesis of ammonia from atmospheric nitrogen during World War I 
was mentioned earlier. Another important product, stimulated by wartime 
shortages, was synthetic detergents. The first research on soaplike properties of 
nonsoapy substances was in Germany by Krafft in 1886-1987. The first deter- 
gent on the market was Nekal, produced by BASF in 1917. It was not suitable 
for washing but later found markets as a wetting agent. The sulfated fatty 
alcohols investigated by Daimler and Platz of I.G. Farben were introduced com- 
mercially as Igepons in 1930. A more important class of detergents, character- 
ized by minimal production of lather (making them useful for washing 
machines), was discovered by Schoeller and Wittwer while working for I.G. Far- 
ben (1930). A further improvement in performance in uhard" water came about 
from the addition of complex phosphates resulting from research in several com- 
panies during the 1930s. In the late 19609 it was discovered that phosphate- 
based detergents were polluting lakes and streams (eutrophication). As a result 
of public outcry and environmental regulation, they were eliminated. 
Other products of wartime shortages were synthetic rubber and synthetic 
gasoline (by the Fischer-Tropsch process). Synfuels had not yet reached the 
marketplace except during wartime and in South Africa. But in the case of 
rubber, the substitute displaced the natural product. Natural rubber had been 
shown to be a polymer of isoprene by C. Greville Williams in 1875, and isoprene 
from turpentine was first polymerized in a laboratory in 1892 by W. Tilden, but 
nothing further was done because of scarcity of natural sources of isoprene. The 
Russian I. Kondakow first polymerized butadiene in 1900; S.V. Lebedev made a 
rubberlike product from butadiene in 1910. The use of metallic sodium (Na) as a 
polymerization catalyst for butadiene was discovered in 1910 independently by 
C. Harris in Germany and by F.E. Matthews and E.H. Strange in the UK, also 
in 1910. The pressure of wartime needs and UK blockades in 1914-1918 induced 
German chemists to develop an alternative synthetic elastomer by polymerizing 
dimethyl butadiene, which they were able to synthesize on a small scale from 
acetylene (made from calcium carbide). 
The wartime German synthetic rubber was expensive and of poor quality. 
The next commercial synthetic was Thiokol developed by Patrick in 1922. The 
first important commercial synthetic rubber was Dupont's Neoprene (a polymer 
of chloroprene) discovered by Arnold M. Collins in 1929 at the suggestion of 
Wallace Carothers. The raw material for chloroprene is monovinylacetylene. 
This is a compound accidently discovered in 1920 as an impurity in divinyl- 
acetylene, a trimer of acetylene (which was discovered by Julius Nieuwland in 
1906). Neoprene was commercialized by Dupont in 1931. Another synthetic 
rubber, Butyl, was introduced by Standard Oil Co. of NJ ca. 1935. 
Meanwhile, the German firm I.G. Farben concentrated on butadiene-based 
polymers, under the name Runa (taking the na from the sodium catalyst), begin- 
ning in 1925. But the Buna rubbers, at  first, did not have good properties and 
commercial success was considerably delayed. The most successful version, 
Buna-S, was a copolymer of Buna rubber with styrene, which went into produc- 
tion in 1939. 
The second world war cut off natural rubber supplies from both the Ger- 
mans and the Allies, which resulted in almost total replacement of the natural 
product by a variety of synthetics. The type of synthetic rubber that is most 
common today is styrene butadiene rubber (SBR), a copolymer of styrene and 
butadiene. Both styrene and butadiene are now derived from ethylene (itself 
derived from ethane obtained from natural gas or petroleum refineries). 
The petrochemical industry, which currently produces most of thc basic 
feedstocks for synthetic rubber, plastics, and many other products, was cssen- 
tially created by a dramatic shift in the economics of petroleum refining. This 
came about as a consequence of the growth of the automobile industry after 1910 
and the need to produce motor gasoline in large quantities. Before 1913 gasoline 
was obtained as a by-product of illuminating oil (kerosene). It was simply the 
lightest, most volatile of the liquid "fractionsn obtainable by distillation of crude 
oil, and consisted mainly of light paraffins. Only about 15% of the refinery out- 
put was directly usable as motor fuel. It had an octane number of around 50, 
which limited gasoline engines to a compression ratio of about 5:1, due to engine 
knocking. 
The first to recognize the problem, and to exploit the opportunity it 
created, was William Burton of Indiana Standard (later Amoco). Burton suc- 
cessfully developed and commercialized the batch-type thermal-cracking process 
in 1913. By cracking heavier paraffin fractions, it enabled refiners to double 
their gasoline output. The process also increased the amount of some other 
hydrocarbons, such as aromatics, which increased the octane level as well. This 
made the process an extraordinarily profitable one. Oil companies started 
searching immediately for better processes (partly to cut down on royalty pay- 
ments). By 1922 several continuous versions of the original batch-cracking pro- 
cess had been developed. The development of thermal-cracking processes 
incidentally opened the door to large-scale production of other petrochemicals, 
such as ethylene, propylene, and butadiene. Another response to the problem of 
engine knocking, mentioned above, was the search for a suitable gasoline additive 
to increase the octane number. The result was tetraethyl lead, discovered in 
1921 by a small team of chemists led by Charles Kettering and Thomas Midgley, 
sponsored by General Motors (GM). The problem then shifted to production, 
and a process developed by Charles A. Kraus and Conrad C. Callis was commer- 
cialized by Dupont in 1924. The additive was then sold to gasoline refiners by 
Ethyl Corp., jointly created by GM and Standard Oil, for use in premium gaso- 
line. 
In 1923 the French chemical engineer Eugene Houdry began working on a 
new catalytic approach to petroleum cracking. The technology was developed 
slowly, with help from Vacuum Oil Co. (later Socony-Vacuum and later still 
Mobil) and from Sun Oil Co. The Houdry (batch) process was finally commer- 
cialized in 1938. It  sharply increased the octane level, permitting 100-octane 
gasoline (for aircraft engines) to be produced on a large scale in time for World 
War 11. To achieve further efficiency gains, and again, to avoid paying royalties, 
a consortium led by Standard Oil of N J  (later Exxon) was formed in 1938 to 
develop a continuous catalytic process. The first success was achieved in 1942. 
Mobil introduced its own continuous process in the same year. German needs 
for aviation gasoline during World War I1 resulted in the further development of 
catalytic hydrogenation processes, both for petroleum and for coal. 
The first synthetic fibers were baaed on a reconstituted natural polymer, 
cellulose. Nitrocellulose was discovered by Christian Schoenbein (Switzerland) 
in 1846. Joseph Swan (UK) made fibers from nitrocellulose in 1883 (searching 
for an improved carbon filament for incandescent light bulbs). In fact, such a 
process was successfully introduced for light bulb filaments in 1894 and contin- 
ued to be used until tantalum and tungsten filaments appeared after 1908. 
Hilaire de Chardonnet (France) spun them into the first artificial silk (1878-84). 
The cuprammonium process for polymerizing cellulosic fibers was discovered by 
M.E. Schweitzer in 1857, tried out in the search for filaments for light bulbs by 
Edward Weston in 1882, and applied to artificial silk by the French chemist 
Louis Henri Despeissis in 1890. It was briefly commercialized in Germany (1898) 
but was soon displaced by the viscose process developed in the UK by C.F. Cross 
and E.J. Bevan (1893). The latter was commercialized after 1905 by Cour- 
taulds. A third process, the acetate process, was also anticipated by Cross and 
Bevan but developed and commercialized by Henri and Camille Dreyfus 
(1902-1912). A method of making the yarn was developed in the US by Arthur 
D. Little and others (1902). The cuprammonium process was revived after 1919 
when the process of stretch spinning (invented by Edmund Thiele) was perfected 
by Elsaesser. Cellulosic fibers made by all of the processes, under the composite 
term rayon, carved out a modest market niche over the ensuing decades for 
clothing (e.g., lingerie) and for insulation, carpets, upholstery, furnishings, blank- 
ets, and tire cords. 
The next and somewhat bigger step was the development of true (noncellu- 
losic) synthetics, beginning with polyamides (Nylon) and polyesters (Dacron). 
These were natural targets for industrial research once the basic principles of 
polymer chemistry had been unraveled in the 1920s by Hermann Staudinger, 
Karl Freudenberg, and others at I.G. Farben, building on a growing fund of 
knowledge of coal-tar chemistry, acetylene chemistry, and basic research on p r e  
tein synthesis conducted by Emil Fischer. The most famous (and profitable) 
synthetic fiber was Dupont's Nylon discovered by Wallace Carothers in 1930. 
The method of drawing the molten polymer into a fiber was found by Julius Wil- 
till, working under Carothers. Production began in 1938 and was immediately 
diverted to parachutes for the duration of the war. Perlon, a similar fiber, was 
developed independently by P. Schlack of I.G. Farben. After the war both Nylon 
and Perlon were spectacular successes and were used to make many of the same 
products that had originally used rayon (especially hosiery). There were also 
some new applications, such as Ustretchn Nylon developed by Louis Billion in 
1950. Nylon was almost immediately challenged by polyacrylics (e.g., Orlon 
1950) and polyesters (e.g., Dacron). The latter was discovered by J.R. Whinfield 
and J.T. Dixon in the UK in 1941 and commercialized in 1953 by ICI and 
Dupont. By 1980 there were 23 generic types of synthetic fibers, and both 
natural silk and rayon had largely disappeared. To date, synthetics have failed 
to displace either cotton or wool in absolute terms, though they have captured 
virtually all growth in the textile sector for the last three decades or more and 
now dominate the market as a whole (Figure 15). 
Figure 15. Consumption of natural and man-made fibers. (Source: Teztile Organon 52, 
March 1981.) 
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Baekeland and commercialized soon after. It is widely used in consumer prod- 
ucts, such as telephones. Basic research in polymer chemistry was later applied 
successfully to other bulk polymers such as polystyrene, polyvinyl chloride 
(PVC), and polyethylene. Both vinyl chloride and styrene were first resinified in 
the laboratory before 1840, but practical applications awaited greater under- 
standing of polymer chemistry and better manufacturing techniques. PVC and 
polystyrene were commercialized by I.G. Farben in 1930 and 1931, respectively. 
Methyl methacrylate was first polymerized in 1877 by the German chemists 
Fittig and Paul. The acrylics were first developed for use in automobile safety 
glass by Otto Rbhm in 1912. Commercialization of acrylic esters for adhesives 
and paints began in 1927 by the firm of Rbhm and Haas. Polymerization of 
methacrylic ethyl ester and methacrylic nitrile was demonstrated by William 
Chalmers in 1929-1930, and glasslike acrylic polymers were developed for the 
market by Rowland Hill and J.W.C. Crawford of ICI in the early 1930s. Rbhm 
and Haas introduced Plexiglass in 1935. Dupont and ICI followed a year or two 
later with their own versions. The success of clear glasslike polymers stimulated 
a research group at Corning Glass Co. to explore silicone-based alternatives. Sil- 
icones did not succeed in this application, but by the mid-1930s silicones found 
many other uses, especially as specialized electrical insulating materials. Dow- 
Corning Co. was created to specialize in these materials. 
By contrast, polyethylene (the first of a larger class called polyolefins) was 
first synthesized at ICI (UK) in 1936 by R.O. Gibson and M.W. Perrin, and 
manufactured commercially soon afterward. It found an important early use as 
a high-quality electrical insulation material. It subsequently has found a host of 
other applications such as the thin transparent films used for packaging. 
Polyurethanes (based on the polymerization of isocyanates, another product of 
German research) reached the marketplace in 1954 for applications such as 
foamed insulation, foam rubber, and upholstery materials. 
DDT was first synthesized in 1874 by Othmar Zeidler, but discovery of its 
insecticidal properties in 1940 by Paul Mueller, a chemist at Ciba-Geigy, 
deserves mention. It played a major role during World War I1 itself and after- 
ward, in controlling malaria and other insect-borne diseases. Its great success 
stimulated a considerable amount of research during the 1940s and early 1950s 
by chemical companies to find other useful insecticides, fungicides, herbicides, 
rodenticides, and so on. Among the most important was the family of insecti- 
cides, including chlordane (1944), aldrin, and dieldrin (both 1947), all discovered 
by the chemist Julius Hyman and his associates. Other useful insecticides intro- 
duced about that time included hexachlorobenzene (HCB), toxaphene, hepta- 
chlor, and the herbicide 2-4-D. Since the early 1960s, however, increasing con- 
cerns about the environmental impact of these chemicals have triggered a shift 
toward biodegradable pesticides. 
Still another outgrowth of the coal-tar-based synthetic dye industry in Ger- 
many was the sulfonamide family of drugs, better known as sulfa drugs. They 
are all based on the chemical p-aminobenzenesulfonamide, which was syn- 
thesized in 1908 by P. Gelmo. Its first use was as  the basis for a family of dyes 
(azo dyes), commercialized in Germany before World War I. The antibacterial 
properties of these chemicals were discovered later by accident. The first sulfa 
drug patented by Fritz Mietsch and Josef Klarer of I.G. Farben was Prontosil 
(1932). Research and testing accelerated after 1936, by which time French, UK, 
and American research teams were also at work. 
By 1943 a large number of drugs in this family had been synthesized, 
including sulfanilamide, sulfathiazole, sulfasuxadine, sulfaguanidine, sulfadiazine, 
sulfamerazine, and sulfapyradine. They were found to be highly effective against 
many bacterial infections, ranging from puerperal ("childbed") fever to meningi- 
tis, gonorrhea, pneumococcic pneumonia, wound infections, and burns. As a 
result, the death rate from many bacterial diseases and infections dropped sharp- 
ly, and some (such as gangrene) have virtually disappeared. Sulfa drugs cut the 
mortality rate of wartime casualties dramatically in World War 11. 
The sulfas were soon overshadowed by another class of therapeutic agents, 
the antibiotics. The starting point was the discovery of the bactericidal effects of 
a natural mold discovered by Alexander Fleming in the UK in 1928. Research 
proceeded slowly in the 1930s as methods of growing the mold and separating 
the active ingredient had to be developed, mainly by Raistrick. This work was 
completed at Oxford by a team headed by Howard Walter Florey. Semisyn- 
thetic penicillins were finally isolated and commercialized by the Beecham Group 
(UK) in 1957. The second major antibiotic was streptomycin, discovered in 1943 
after an intensive search of soil organisms by Selman Waksman. Pilot produc- 
tion began at Merck in 1944 using the submerged-vat fermentation process. 
Wartime needs certainly accelerated its commercialization and motivated the 
search for other "miracle drugs." There was a spectacular increase in the number 
of antibiotics discovered and brought to market in the first few years after the 
war, including teramycin, aureomycin, tetracyclines, and chloramphenicol. In 
later years chemists modified the natural molecules themselves to create new 
antibiotics such as ampicillin and cephalexin. 
The advances in antisepsis and chemotherapy, especially for bacterial infec- 
tions, have been cumulatively very important. Many of the killer diseases in the 
past have now been vanquished. The hazards of infection resulting from surgery 
have been correspondingly reduced. This, in turn, has increased the practicality 
of far more aggressive surgical procedures such as multiple heart bypass opera- 
tions and organ transplants. These advances have significantly cut infant mor- 
tality and increased human life expectancy by more than 30 years. This has 
indirectly contributed to the growth of a large health-care industry focused on 
the treatment of heart disease, cancer, and geriatric degenerative diseases associ- 
ated with advanced age. 
However, notwithstanding the economic importance of the various branches 
of the chemical industry cited above (and others not discussed, such as refri- 
gerants and color photography), it is difficult to identify a single turning point or 
a critical breakthrough of the kind that seems to have occurred several times in 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Progress seems to have been fairly 
smooth and continuous over a broad front and over many decades. The fact 
that the chemical industry has been, from its beginnings, largely "research 
driven" may be responsible for this. 
5.2. Radio, television, and microwaves [5] 
The second area of dramatic progress during the fourth transformation is that of 
electronics. This is also a direct outgrowth of developments in the nineteenth 
century, beginning with Michael Faraday's discoveries, continuing with James 
Clerk Maxwell's theory of electromagnetism with its momentous prediction of 
traveling electromagnetic waves (1860), followed by Heinrich Hertz's experimen- 
tal demonstrations of the effect (1887). Oliver Lodge in the UK in 1894 
developed a relatively practical detector for radio waves (a vial filled with metal 
filings, which he called a "coherern) but did not patent the idea. 
It was Guglielmo Marconi in Italy and the UK who conceived of a system 
of wireless telegraphy and carried it to realization. In 1896 in Italy, he used 
Lodge's device to transmit Morse code over a distance of two miles. He then 
moved to the UK and formed a company (with Lodge and Fleming as consul- 
tants) to develop a commercially successful radio-telegraphy system. In 1901 he 
began to provide ship-to-shore telegraph services for the British Admiralty and 
for Lloyds of London. Marconi's breakthrough was followed by a burst of inven- 
tions and innovations. 
The first to transmit speech by radio was Reginold A. Fessenden in 1900. 
Fessenden developed an electrolytic detector, consisting of a fine platinum wire 
resting on the surface of an acid bath. This became the standard of sensitivity 
for a decade. He then patented the heterodyne system of transmission and 
detection in 1905, although it was not feasible until a decade later, when vacuum 
tubes were available. He also commissioned the development of a high-frequency 
alternator, to produce the carrier signal with the help of Ernst Alexanderson of 
GE. Fessenden continued to develop voice transmission technology, achieving 
the l0Cbmile range in 1907. 
The first vacuum-tube diode (switching device) was patented in 1904 by 
John Ambrose Fleming in the UK. It was a straightforward adaptation of the 
"Edison Effect," discovered in the 1870s in connection with the development of 
the incandescent light. The crucial invention - one of the most important of all 
time - was an improved version with an extra element, called the triode, or 
"audion." It was invented by Lee De Forest and patented in 1906, though Flem- 
ing always claimed it to be a trivial variation (by adding a "bent wiren) of his 
diode. Even in its crude form, the audion was far superior to any other form of 
radio detector. De Forest actually neglected his own invention for several years, 
due to other distractions, but he took it up and developed it further starting 
about 1911. He subsequently sold the rights to AT&T and Western Electric in 
1913-1914 for use in radiotelephones and repeaters for longlines. The original 
triode spawned thousands of specialized vacuum tubes over the next two decades 
and made radio, television, radar, and all other electronic devices feasible. 
In 1911 Edwin Armstrong in the US and von Lieben in Germany 
(Telefunken) both realized that the triode could be used for amplification. The 
next step was the feedback or regenerative circuit (1912), which greatly 
improved both the selectivity and sensitivity of detection circuits. Claimants to 
this invention include Armstrong, De Forest, Irving Langmuir (GE), Meissner 
(Telefunken), and C.S. Franklin and H.J. Round (Marconi Company). Arm- 
strong and De Forest litigated for more than 20 years regarding US patent rights 
on regenerative curcuits; the case was finally resolved in favor of De Forest. In 
1913 the triode was first used in a high-frequency oscillator, the first nonmechan- 
ical means of producing high-frequency radio waves. Again, rival claimants 
included Armstrong, Meissner, and Franklin and Round. Meanwhile, electron 
tubes (valves) were greatly improved by Langmuir's introduction of "hardn 
vacuum in 1914-1915, which gave GE an important patent position in the radio 
industry. The vacuum-tube oscillator quickly replaced the Fessenden- 
Alexandersson electromechanical system for transmission. 
In 1918 Armstrong invented and patented the "superheterodynen circuit 
(an improvement of Fessenden's scheme for transmitting radio signals as 
differences), which he sold to Westinghouse. Westinghouse operated the first 
commercial radio station, KDKA, in Pittsburgh (1922) and soon began commer- 
cial nianufacture of radio receivers. Superheterodyne radios were commercially 
available in 1924. In the meantime, Radio Corporation of America (RCA) was 
created by separating the US Marconi Company from its UK parent, and endow- 
ing it with GEYs radio patents (in exchange for part ownership). RCA later 
acquired the radio patents owned by AT&T. 
The diffusion process was rapid thereafter. Sales of radio sets in the US 
skyrocketed from $60 million in 1922 to $900 million in 1929. In 1922 Armstrong 
invented and patented the ultra-sensitive super-regenerative receiver (mainly for 
shortwave use), which he sold to RCA. In 1933, Armstrong introduced essen- 
tially the present frequency modulation (FM) system, although the system was 
resisted by the major networks because of a potential conflict with TV for fre- 
quency bands. However, commercial FM broadcasting began in 1939. 
Television is another of the three revolutionary innovations of the fourth 
technological transformation. It is an obvious extension of radio, though it is as 
much of a qualitative improvement over radio as the telephone is over the tele- 
graph. Indeed, the first device suitable for a scanner (to divide a picture into 
individual "chunksn suitable for sequential transmission) was the so-called Nip- 
kow disk (1884). All the basic principles of a mechanical scanning system suit- 
able for picture transmission were set forth at that time, even though the radio 
itself had not yet been invented. 
Obviously practical implementation of radio and TV was impossible 
without amplification, broadcasting, and receiving circuitry. Indeed, these tech- 
nologies, like the automobile, resulted from a convergence of many predecessors. 
Thus it was not until the 1920s that experimental television became possible. 
Demonstration transmissions using Nipkow disks were made by John Logie 
Baird (UK) and Ernst Alexanderson and C.F. Jenkins (US) from 1929 until 
1935. However, the first TV picture had only 30 lines. The mechanical Nipkow 
disks were a technological dead end. Electronic-scanning and image- 
reproduction tubes were a far better solution. The cathode-ray oscilloscope, 
invented by Ferdinand Braun (1897), and an improved photoelectric cell, 
invented by Julius Elster and Hans Geitel (1905), were crucial. The electronic 
TV system was first conceived in 1907 by Boris Rosing in St. Petersburg and by 
A.A. Campbell-Swinton in the UK about the same time. The first successful TV 
scanner was the iconoscope, a specialized cathode-ray tube, invented by Vladimir 
Zworykin - a former student of Rosing - at  Westinghouse (1919) and patented in 
1923. It was later transferred to RCA (1930). The iconoscope was challenged 
later by a competing approach, the "dissector tuben invented by Philo Farns- 
worth (1927), and further developed by Philco. 
The first TV transmission based on electronic technology was carried out 
by the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) in 1936. It used a system 
developed by EM1 Ltd. based on the Zworykin iconoscope. RCA commercialized 
TV in the US in 1936, and Telefunken did the same in Germany. Regular com- 
mercial broadcasts were being made from at least 10 cities in the US and Europe 
before 1940. Progress in commercial use was interrupted by World War 11, but 
research continued and broadcasting was resumed after the war with much 
better equipment. By 1953 there were 328 stations in the US and 27 million 
receivers. Color TV broadcasting began in the US in 1954, and transistorized 
portable TV sets were first produced in 1955. TV is now found in virtually every 
household in the US. 
Radar is an extension of radio technology in another (higher) frequency 
domain. The purpose, of course, is not to transmit a message to a receiver but 
rather to bounce a simple signal off a distant object repeatedly and detect the 
reflected pulse-echo with enough accuracy to compute its distance, size, shape, 
and speed. It was used for scientific purposes as early as 1924, and the pulse 
principle was demonstrated in 1925 by Gregory Breit and Merle Tuve. An ob- 
stacle detector using pulsed radar was installed on the French liner Normandie 
in 1935. It was later developed for military purposes, to detect incoming 
bombers at  a distance, by secret research projects carried out independently dur- 
ing the 1930s by the US Navy, the German Navy, and the Royal Air Force. The 
UK program, led by Robert Watson-Watt, was the most advanced, and the first 
five UK military radar installations were in place in March 1938. The first suc- 
cessful US test was in 1939, and commercial manufacturing began shortly 
thereafter. Radar is the basis of all aircraft navigation and traffic control today. 
The key UK invention that made radar practical was the multi-cavity mag- 
netron (H.A.H. Boot and J.T. Randall). By 1940 this device was capable of gen- 
erating 10 kw. of pulse power at a wavelength of a few centimeters. An alterna- 
tive power source, the klystron, was invented in the US by R.H. and S.A. Varian 
(Varian Associates). Both the magnetron and the klystron were developed from 
De Forest's triode beginning in the 1920s. More compact microwave power gen- 
erators are also in microwave ovens used today in millions of restaurants and 
households. The microwave oven is a revolution, of sorts, inasmuch as it reduces 
energy consumption and cuts cooking time by a large factor. 
5.3. Solid-state electronics and computers [6] 
The two most significant inventions of the second world war and the immediate 
postwar era were the electronic digital computer, developed at the University of 
Pennsylvania by J. Presper Eckert and John Mauchly in 1944, and the transis- 
tor, developed at Bell Labs. by William Shockley, John Bardeen, and Walter 
Brattain in 1948. The transistor was the outcome of an RBD project seeking a 
substitute for the vacuum tube, which would be more reliable, would be cheaper 
to manufacture, and would use less electric power. Low-power consumption was 
a primary motivation for the search, since large telephoneswitching systems con- 
sumed a great deal of power. Within a decade transistors (mainly based on the 
semiconductor germanium) had replaced tubes in many applications. 
By the late 1950s, in fact, a serious manufacturing problem had emerged. 
Electronic circuits (especially computers) were getting so complex that wiring 
and interconnections were becoming costly and unreliable. This problem 
motivated the development of the monolithic integrated circuit (elements of 
which were independently invented by Jack Kilby of Texas Instruments and 
Robert Noyce of Fairchild in 1958). This, in turn, launched the line of silicon- 
based semiconductor development that led to largescale integration (LSI) in the 
late 1960s, very largescale integration (VLSI) in the late 1970s, and finally 
ultra-largescale integration (ULSI) in the 1980s. These, of course, are the acro- 
nyms for successive generations of silicon chips, the basic building blocks of vir- 
tually all modern electronic devices, from radios and radar to telephone- 
switching systems, computers, and most other electronic products. By the 1970s, 
in fact, telephoneswitching systems were essentially specialized digital comput- 
ers, and computers were increasingly linked by telephone lines. In fact, the com- 
puter industry and the telephone industry had become so inextricably 
intertwined that a major restructuring of the regulated telephone industry 
became inevitable. 
The history of the computer cannot be told without giving due credit to the 
punched paper-tape control system used in the famous Jacquard loom (1804) [7] 
and the mechanical inventions of Charles Babbage during the 1820s and 1830s, 
not to mention earlier efforts of Blaise Pascal, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibnitz, and 
others. A large gear-operated "difference engine," with 15,000 moving parts 
(based on some of Babbage's ideas), was built by George B. Grant in 1872. It 
was displayed at the Philadelphia Centennial (1876), and a copy of it was used 
for actuarial calculations for 20 years. 
The first mechanical calculating machine was patented by Frank Baldwin 
in 1873. Baldwin went into business with J.R. Monroe, and after 1911 the 
machine became known as the Monroe calculator. A keyboard-operated desktop 
calculator ("Comptometern) was developed by Dorr Felt in 1887, and it became 
commercially successful almost immediately. William Burroughs invented an 
adding machine that would automatically print results on a paper tape (1888). 
It, too, was the foundation of a major company. All of these machines found a 
useful niche in offices. The cash register, which embodied a mechanical calcula- 
tor, was also the basis of a very successful company. Both Burroughs and NCR 
later became important computer manufacturers. 
The punched-card sorting, tabulating, and calculating machines invented 
by Herman Hollerith during the 1880s constituted a powerful new application of 
the Jacquard-loom punched-card control technology. It was successfully put to 
use for tabulating the results of the 1890 and 1900 US censuses. The Census 
Bureau's discomfort with total dependence on a single supplier combined with 
the expiration of Hollerith's basic patents created opportunity for other firms 
(e.g., Powers, later Remington-Rand) though hardly a major new industry. In 
1912 Hollerith's Tabulating Machine Co. became the core of a merger that 
created Computing-Tabulating-Recording Co. (later changed to IBM). These 
two firms later dominated the computer business, at  least in its first decade. But 
the critical computer inventions came from outside. 
There were two strands of computer development. One, began with the 
"differential analyzer," a mechanical analog computer consisting of gears, wheels, 
belts, and shafts linked by torque amplifiers built by Vannevar Bush and H.L. 
Hazen in 1930. It was designed to solve simple differential equations, especially 
in the analysis of electrical circuits. A second-generation differential analyzer fol- 
lowed in 1935, with electrical devices substituting for some of the mechanical 
components. When complete it contained 150 motors, 2,000 vacuum tubes, 
thousands of relays, and 200 miles of wire. It weighed 100 tons (Shurkin, 1984, 
p. 79). However, this too was a technological dead end. 
The second strand of development was the digital computer, based on the 
mathematical ideas of George Boole in the 1850s (Boolean algebra and logic) and 
Alan Turing in the 1930s. It  was Turing who designed a conceptual idealized 
computer (the "Turing machinen) using Boolean logic. With it he introduced 
fundamental notions such as computability (1937). Turing was, in effect, the 
first modern computer scientist. At Bell Labs., George Stibitz designed the 
first-known electromechanical relay computer, the Model I. It was completed in 
1939, and Models 11-V were completed in subsequent years (1940-1946). John 
Atanasoff (Iowa State University) worked on his ABC electronic computer from 
1938 to 1942. Atanasoff completed a small prototype device in 1939 using elec- 
tronic circuitry only. But no follow-up machine was ever completed by him (due 
to lack of funding), nor did he obtain any patents. However, a later court case 
between Remington-Rand and Honeywell involving Eckert and Mauchly's claims 
gave Atanasoff legel credit for the invention of the general purpose electronic 
computer. Recent scholarship suggests that this was a miscarriage of justice 
(Shurkin, 1984). However, Atanasoff certainly made a major contribution. 
Starting in 1939, with help from IBM, Howard Aiken of Harvard built the 
IBM Automatic Sequence Control Calculator (Mark I), which was completed in 
1944. It contained 750,000 parts and was able to compress six months of calcu- 
lations into one day using a desktop machine. It was said to be the world's first 
automatic computer.[8] By the time of its completion it was, however, already 
obsolete. The progenitor of most future general purpose computers was the 
Electronic Numerical Integrator And Computer (ENIAC), designed by a team 
led by Eckert and Mauchly a t  the University of Pennsylvania, under a contract 
from the US Army. The contract was signed in 1943, and the computer was 
operating in 1945 (doing calculations for the A-bomb project, among other 
things). It was publicly unveiled in 1946. ENIAC contained 17,248 vacuum 
tubes, 1,500 relays, 70,000 resistors, 10,000 capacitors, and 6,000 switches. It 
could perform a multiplication in 2.8 milliseconds, divide in 24 milliseconds, and 
calculate a trajectory in 30 seconds. It consumed 174 kw. It lacked a stored pro- 
gram, but the decision to leave it out was made in the interests of shortening the 
development period. A contract to build a second computer containing that 
feature (EDVAC) was already signed by late 1944 (Shurkin, 1984). 
After the war (1947-1949), the UK government sponsored the development 
of a general purpose computer, called Electronic Delay Storage Automatic Calcu- 
lator (EDSAC). The UK government did support early computer development 
projects during the war, primarily in connection with deciphering German codes. 
By some accounts the first true electronic computer was COLOSSUS, built by 
the UK team of Turing, A.H. Flowers, and M.H.A. Newman (1943). It had 1,800 
vacuum tubes and used a high-speed (5,000 character per second) punched 
paper-tape data input. However, it was designed only for code breaking and 
could not be used for any other purpose. A larger version was built the following 
year. However, the UK gradually fell behind in later years. The first commer- 
cial electronic computer, UNIVAC I (1952), was the direct descendent of ENIAC 
and EDVAC. 
The transistor, introduced in 1948, required only a few more years to reach 
the stage where it could be produced in quantity. It finally displaced the vacuum 
tube in computer logic circuitry in the mid-1950s. One of the first transistorized 
computers was the Philco 2000 (1954). The solid-state magnetic core memory 
was first introduced in the MIT "Whirlwind" (1951). It was adopted for com- 
mercial computers in the late 1950s. The Control Data 6600 (ca. 1965) was the 
first computer designed to utilize integrated circuitry. (IBM's 360, introduced 
about the same time, used hybrid circuitry.) The memory chip with 1,024 bytes 
of storage capacity was introduced by Intel Corp. in 1969, followed by the first 
silicon microprocessor the following year. Those were the innovations that made 
the personal computer possible and began the fifth technological transformation, 
which is now under way. 
The computer found many unexpected success in the market even in its 
earliest years. It has made IBM one of the world's largest and richest corpora- 
tions in only 20 years. Yet there are still surprising doubts as to exactly what 
service the computer has performed up to now - apart from its obvious use for 
scientific computation and for such bookkeeping and accounting functions as 
keeping track of airline reservations, customer accounts, payrolls, and taxes. The 
gross revenues of the computer industry and the semiconductor industry are 
already approaching those of the auto industry, and will certainly surpass them 
soon. Yet the long-expected convergence of computer technology with telecom- 
munications technology - computers linked into enormous open (public) net- 
works and moving massive amounts of information back and forth with 
minimum human intervention - has not yet occurred on a significant scale. 
5.4. Aircraft a n d  a i r  t ransportat ion [Q] 
As mentioned earlier, the aircraft industry, like the auto, is in some sense an out- 
growth of the development of the bicycle and the internal-combustion engine. 
The growth of the auto industry depended very much on the availability of 
cheap steel and steel-manufacturing technologies. Likewise, the aircraft industry 
only became a commercial success with the development of the all-metal (alumi- 
num) plane. Thus, the long period between 1903, when the Wright brothers first 
demonstrated powered flight, and 1926, the advent of the first commercial 
airliner (Ford Trimotor), was technologically driven. Rich dilettantes provided a 
small amount of venture capital and some prize money, but young adventurers 
provided the energy and 'sweat-equity." Military services financed much of the 
early development, especially just before and during the first world war. 
The Wrights were hardly the first to  fly, even in a heavier-than-air 
machine. (Flight in balloons already had a long history, which need not be 
recapitulated here.) Otto Lilienthal made 2,000 flights in his hang glider between 
1891 and 1896 before being killed in a crash. Hiram Maxim (better known as the 
inventor of a machine gun) built a steam-powered aircraft that rose a few inches 
off the ground (1894). Samuel Langley's pilotless steam-powered Aerodrome flew 
4,200 feet over the Potomac River in 1896. With a $50,000 grant from the US 
Congress, Langley continued to work toward powered flight, and he was perhaps 
unlucky not to have made the decisive breakthrough in 1903. Having realized 
that steam power did not offer sufficient promise, he shifted his attention to 
internal-combustion engines. Langley's pilot, Charles Manly, designed and built 
a rotary engine that generated 52 hp with a weight of only 151 lb. But, because 
it was designed with insufficient attention to controllability in flight, Aerodrome 
failed to take off in two attempts. The Wright brother's biplane, by contrast, 
had a much less powerful engine but a better and more controllable aerodynamic 
design. Their experience as bicycle racers and builders may have been decisive 
(Crouch, 1987). Their critical contribution was the recognition that the pilot 
must exercise active control over motions in all three independent degrees of 
freedom, viz., pitch, roll, and yaw. 
In fact, the science of aeronautics lagged behind the practice. Pilots were 
actually flying for several years before theory could explain the phenomena of 
stall and spin, for example (Wegener, 1986). Even when the basic theory caught 
up (ca. 1910), the critical problems of flight control could only be solved by trial 
and error. Many pilot errors resulted in fatal crashes. Not until the mid-1920s 
did a combination of accumulated experience, improved theoretical understand- 
ing, and better instruments permit pilots to undertake long flights through less 
than ideal weather conditions with reasonable confidence of survival. When 
Charles Lindbergh flew alone from Newfoundland to Paris in 1927 his achieve- 
ment gave him instantaneous world fame. It also created a climate of acceptance 
for air transportation. 
Development of aircraft between 1908 and 1918 was financed largely by the 
military. Although technological progress was considerable, especially during 
World War I, aircraft played only a peripheral role in the war. Primitive aircraft 
undertook duels (dogfights) with each other, but planes could not carry enough 
payload of bombs or ammunition, nor could they fly fast enough or far enough to  
have a significant impact on ground operations until the end of the war. By that 
time, however, the potential impact of air power on future wars was clear, a t  
least to a few pioneers, such as Giulio Douhet and Billy Mitchell. 
Actually, the first scheduled passenger service in the US was the St. 
Petersburg-Tampa Air Boat (1914). Dozens of other airlines opened, merged, 
and closed through the twenties. A London-Paris service was inaugurated in 
1919. Airmail began in the US in the 1920s, partly as an indirect subsidy to the 
fledgling industry, but passenger service was unreliable and irregular. The 
situation began to stabilize when the Ford 5-AT Trimotor, the first all-metal 
plane (Tin Goose), was introduced (ca. 1926). It was followed in short order by 
the Boeing 247 (1933) - prototype of modern airliners - and the Douglas DC-3 
(1935). The Douglas DC-3 was the moat successful single aircraft design of all 
time. More than 10,000 DC-3s were eventually built, and some of them are still 
flying in the 19809. Scheduled trans-Pacific service was initiated in 1935. 
Aircraft size, power, and speed increased continuously as demand for 
passenger and freight service began to grow. Meanwhile, the capabilities of the 
piston engine began to approach natural limits in the 19309. (The Rolls Royce 
Merlin engine, which powered the Spitfire, Hurricane, and Mustang of World 
War 11, has never been improved upon in terms of power output per unit 
weight.) To achieve better performance a new type of engine was needed. That 
was the gas turbine, which took two forms: the turboprop and the turbojet. 
The former was a transitional engine; the latter is the primary source of power 
for all high-performance aircraft today. 
The turbojet was first proposed (and patented) by Frank Whittle of the 
Royal Air Force (1928). The first working model was tested in 1937. A competi- 
tive German version built by Pabst von Ohain flew a few months later. The first 
military jet aircraft was the Heinkel He 178 (1939). The first UK jet fighter was 
the Gloster E28/29 (1941). The first jet used by a civil airline (1952) was the de 
Havilland Comet, which raised cruising speeds from about 300 mph for the DC-6 
to about 470 mph. Unfortunately several of these planes crashed due to metal- 
fatigue failures attributed to poorly designed windows. The first really successful 
all-jet airliner was the Boeing 707 (1954). It raised cruising speeds to about 550 
mph and became the workhorse of the world's airlines. It was also the progeni- 
tor of a series that still dominates the world's civil airways, including the 727, 
737, 747, and 767. Interestingly, the first and only supersonic civilian airliner 
(the British-French Concorde) has been an economic failure, with no successor 
yet in sight. Meanwhile, the airline industry has grown into a giant, but the rate 
of technological change has slowed down significantly. Problems plaguing the 
industry today have more to do with moving people and baggage on the ground 
than in the air. 
5.5. Conclusion 
The fourth technological transformation has spawned other technologies, includ- 
ing nuclear power and rocketry. Nuclear weapons transformed warfare, and may 
have transformed global politics. But the civilian spin-off, nuclear power, is 
mostly notable for its failed promise of ultra-cheap energy. It now looks like the 
long-term costs of decommissioning nuclear power plants and disposing of their 
radioactive wastes are likely to be far higher than the economic benefits ever 
were. At this point, the unmanned space program has led to minor benefits 
(mainly direct-broadcast satellites and surveillance satellites). The manned 
space program seems to be justified mainly by political calculations (or mis- 
calculations) in comparison with the meager scientific returns and large develop- 
ment costs to date. The possibility of great benefits in the long run cannot be 
ruled out, but they have not yet materialized. 
The vast majority of the innovations during the fourth transformation were 
new materials or new products offering higher performance or greater utility to 
consumers than products or services available previously. This is particularly 
true of the various new and improved electric appliances available to consumers, 
from refrigerators to TVs. It applies also to the 'Lwonder drugsn and synthetic 
fibers, and to some extent to plastics (e.g., new packaging materials). Some 
appliances, notably washers, dryers, dishwashers, and vacuum cleaners could 
also be classed as labor saving, even though most household work - then and 
now - remains unpaid. The net effect was, nevertheless, to allow more women to 
take paid employment, thus increasing the labor force. The advent of civil air 
transportation during this period also could be classified as labor extending, 
inasmuch as it saved travel time for businessmen. The vast extension and 
improvement of the US highway network that began in the 1930s (and 
accelerated in the 1950s) was a response to the growing importance of private 
automobiles. It had the effect, however, of facilitating long-distance truck trans- 
portation. The early impact of this was to weaken the competitive position of 
the railroads and trigger a significant disinvestment in rail transportation (in the 
US, but not in Europe or Japan). However, the long-run effect was to improve 
the efficiency of the distribution system in the US, permitting significant reduc- 
tions in inventory and consequent capital savings. 
The introduction of plastics had no immediate effect on the design and con- 
struction of engineering products (e.g., automobiles) or buildings. Early uses 
were fairly specialized. One of the first substitutions of plastic for metal (except 
in packing) was the introduction of PVC in water-sewer pipes, which gradually 
began to replace cast-iron pipes. Plastics later began to replace die-cast zinc 
parts requiring little structural strength, and still later, stamped metal housings 
for small appliances and some auto parts. Plastics now account for around 10% 
of the weight of automobiles; their higher intrinsic material cost is increasingly 
compensated by reduced fabrication costs. During the current (fifth) transfor- 
mation, the use of plastics in automobiles is likely to increase much further 
(resulting in sharply reduced use of steel and sharply reduced vehicle weight and 
fuel consumption). Thus, despite the high intrinsic energy-content of synthetic 
materials (and light metals as well), their long-term economic impact is quite 
likely to be resource extending. 
Semiconductors have made possible dramatic increases in the performance 
of electronic devices. They have also allowed spectacular reductions in the size 
of electronic devices, from telephone switching systems to radios, TVs, and com- 
puters. One major impact has been the ability to economize on the materials 
and energy required to deliver information services. These services, in turn, have 
unquestionably extended or replaced human labor in a number of areas, includ- 
ing scientific computation, actuarial computation, bookkeeping, accounting, 
drafting, typesetting and composition, and word-processing. The fact that these 
developments have not yet resulted in increases in conventional productivity 
measures has puzzled economists. The leading hypotheses seem to be that the 
statistics themselves are faulty (i.e., we are measuring the wrong things), that 
the improved quality and other new services provided by computers swamps the 
(real) productivity effects, or that most users have not yet learned how to use 
computers competently, especially due to the information overload phenomenon. 
In this connection, it is increasingly plausible that the hierarchical structure of 
most major corporations interferes with effective information flow, and therefore 
with optimum use of computer and telecommunication technology. If so, 
smaller, less rigidly structured organizations will compete more and more 
effectively with large companies until the latter adapt. To date there is no com- 
pelling statistical evidence of either labor or capital savings attributable to the 
convergence of computer and telecommunication technology, but this may well 
be a key feature of the fifth technological transformation now under way. 
8. The Fifth Technological Transformation 1975-? 
The fourth transformation had neither a well-defined beginning nor a well- 
defined end. It does appear, however, that the rate of major innovations (as dis- 
tinguished from revolutionary ones) began to slow down after 1950, while the 
economy as a whole forged ahead more rapidly. At any rate, there seem to have 
been fewer noteworthy innovations in the 1960s and early 1970s than there were 
in the 1930s and 1940s or since 1975. However, if there has been a recent 
speedup (or a prior slowdown), it will be difficult to confirm. 
Clearly, a kind of "sea changen began around 1970, marked by a dramatic 
slowdown in the growth of the US automobile industry and the electric-power 
industry and an actual decline in domestic petroleum production and steel out- 
put. While growth has not necessarily ceased on a worldwide basis (i.e., produc- 
tion has, to some extent, simply moved to Japan or other countries in Asia), 
there is little doubt that consumption of a number of material-intensive and 
energy-intensive products has reached a point of saturation, not only in the 
United States but also in Europe. 
The leading sectors of earlier decades have become lagging sectors. It is 
now widely recognized, and correctly so, that "high techn is the leading sector of 
the 19809. Within this decade, or early in the next one, the computer and 
telecommunications sectors are almost certain to overtake the auto industry and 
its satellites as the "locomotivesn of the world economy. Already, computers and 
related automation equipment have become the dominant form of capital equip- 
ment, and software development and maintenance are becoming major sources of 
employment. 
A revolutionary change in manufacturing appears to be well under way. 
The old approach to large-scale production, by maximum standardization of 
product and specialization of process, appears to be obsolescent. The problem is 
that the extremely specialized nature of mass production raises the costs of prod- 
uct change and therefore slows down innovation (Abernathy, 1978). The way 
out of this dilemma is to use programmable flexible automation - computers and 
robotics (Ayres and Miller, 1983; Ayres, 1984). 
A revolutionary change in the design and use of computers is also in prog- 
ress. The path of progress from 1945 to 1975 was to decrease the size and 
increase the power of centralized mainframes, and to service many users by 
means of time-sharing. The microprocessor and memory on a chip have changed 
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Figure 16. Development of memory and microprocessor chips. (Adapted from Bursky, 
Electronic Design, 1983.) 
this. Mass produced personal computers and engineering work stations now 
offer more than ten times as much computing power per dollar as large main- 
frames. The latter are still needed, but only for systems involving huge data- 
bases and very complex software systems. The emergence of packaged software 
from firms like Microsoft and Lotus has further encouraged the shift away from 
time-sharing and toward networking. 
The linking of public networks of personal computers (and other types of 
equipment, such as television sets) by means of optical fiber telephone lines or 
cable connections appears to be both technologically and economically feasible, 
and is, therefore, inevitable. As networks of this sort begin to expand (in the 
1990s), a variety of new types of information and entertainment services will 
rapidly become available. These will be the most visible signs of the arrival of 
the long-awaited information age. 
To be sure local area networks (LANs) are now in the news, and have 
recently become a recognized category of software. Currently, the term refers to 
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Figure 17. Efficiency of different computing architectures. (Adapted from Electronic 
Design, 7 January 1988.) 
networks linking personal computers within companies or universities. There are 
two groups: the IBM compatibles (3 Com, Novell, Tandy, Gateway, 10-Net, 
IBM PC) and the non-IBM compatibles (Apple, Datapoint). As of 1988, it is 
estimated that 10% of the 19 million PCs are linked by LANs, but market stud- 
ies suggest that more than 50% of the PC will be linked to LANs by 1992 (NY 
Times, 9 September 1988). However, the larger goal of allowing computers built 
by different manufacturers to communicate using software designed by others is 
still remote. 
Two obstacles must clearly be overcome. First, there is an unsolved prob- 
lem of data security. How can such networks protect proprietary data from com- 
puterized theft and computerized sabotage (e.g., Yvirusesn)? The second major 
problem is the lack of uniform standards for software systems. Computers, like 
people, speak in different languages, and there exist no universal translators 
except in science fiction. Nobody knows just how to solve these problems. But, 
in any case, the major social and economic impacts of computers are still in the 
future. Enormous potential still remains for technological progress in the field. 
This is evident from the rapid progress demonstrated in several measures of per- 
formance over the past decades, which continues unabated (Figures 16 and 17). 
Computers have not yet had a major impact on manufacturing, for example, but 
the potential of computer-integrated manufacturing (CIM) is becoming clearer 
by the day. It will almost certainly turn out to be one of the leading sectors of 
the fifth technological transformation. 
7. Conclusions 
Two questions were raised at the outset, namely, Does the history of technology 
support the notion that clusters of innovations tend to occur during troughs in 
the Kondratieff long wave? and Do such clusters trigger the next round of fast 
economic growth? The power of technological innovation to stimulate growth 
cannot be doubted. However, while clusters do seem to occur, they appear to be 
technologically determined. Sometimes they follow major scientific or technolog- 
ical breakthroughs, not bearing any particular relation to overall economic condi- 
tions. In other cases (e.g., the auto, radio-TV, and aircraft) they result from the 
convergence or fusion of several independent lines of development. 
In support of the thesis of technological determination, the major cluster of 
inventions that followed Marconi's venture into radiotelegraphy and especially 
De Forest's invention of the Uaudionn occurred during a period of extremely 
rapid economic growth but (otherwise) relatively slow innovation. This is also 
true of the development of the viscose and acetate processes for rayon, ammonia 
synthesis, Bakelite, and a number of other important innovations in the chemical 
industry. Again, the semiconductor and computer industries were highly innova- 
tive even as the general economy was rapidly expanding throughout the 1960s, 
despite a marked slowdown in most other areas of technology. 
History also seems to support the notion that some major clusters of inven- 
tions and innovations tend to follow great breakthroughs, such as Bell's tele- 
phone or Edison's electric light and generating system, and that the timing of big 
breakthroughs is determined by technological conditions more often than by 
macroeconomic ones. It seems quite evident that clusters of technological inno- 
vations can (and do) stimulate economic growth. Nevertheless, it seems clearly 
evident - as Freeman (1983) has stressed - that periods of rapid growth are typi- 
cally characterized by the difusion of major technologies developed in earlier 
periods but not necessarily the immediately preceding trough. The fact that 
automobile-related technologies were the principal driver of growth after World 
War I1 should suffice to make this point. 
The most difficult question to resolve is whether periods of slow growth are 
effective in stimulating technological innovation. This is where microeconomic 
conditions appear to be most relevant, but the evidence is thinnest. Some evi- 
dence supports such a link, especially if one contrasts the 1920s and 1930s. Dur- 
ing the prosperous 1920s relatively few important new commercial products were 
introduced. After 1930, the rate of new product introductions increased dramat- 
ically. The depression was a major factor. General Electric and Westinghouse, 
for instance, experienced sharp cutbacks in their sales of power-generating equip 
ment to utilities (also suffering from reduced demand). They responded by 
introducing a host of new or greatly improved consumer products to stimulate 
consumer demand for electricity and, of course, to keep their own factories and 
employees busy. Most of these consumer products could have been developed 
and introduced a decade earlier, at least from a technical perspective. 
The rapid rate of introduction of new plastics, synthetic rubbers, and syn- 
thetic fibers by chemical companies beginning in 1930 was undoubtedly also due 
in part to cutbacks in demand for their commodity chemical products such as 
dyes for the textile industry. This is not to deny that some of the new products 
could not have been introduced earlier than they were because they had not yet 
been invented! But some of them could have been invented or commercialized 
sooner than they were, if the firms had been interested in producing them. 
There was a very rapid increase in the number of new plastics and synthetic 
fibers on the market through the 1960s, with an apparent slowdown in growth 
since then. 
Of course, the upsurge in innovation after 1930 was also undoubtedly 
driven by other forces. Military needs prompted the rapid development of radar, 
sonar, the jet engine, the missile, and the atomic bomb. Military requirements, 
both during World War I1 and for two decades thereafter, provided both R&D 
support and initial markets for electronic computers. The needs of the aviation 
industry, civil and military, as well as resource scarcity (or its expectation), 
stimulated the innovation of continuous catalytic cracking. 
On the other hand, the timing of the "miracle drug" innovations seem to 
have been unrelated to macroeconomic factors. The original discoveries of sulfa 
drugs and penicillin were serendipitous. Development proceeded relatively 
slowly until public interest was aroused by spectacular successes. Thereafter, 
the search for more such drugs was exceedingly well financed by profits. The 
slowdown in discovery in recent decades probably reflects the fact that the terri- 
tory has now been fairly thoroughly searched. The recent breakthroughs in 
genetic engineering (ca. 1980) have already initiated a new burst of pharmaceuti- 
cal innovations. The first wave of new products from this industry is already 
beginning to reach the market. 
In summary, it appears that clustering of innovations is partly attributable 
to macroeconomic conditions and partly to wars. On the other hand, other 
causal factors are also operating. One such factor that has not been fully con- 
sidered in this paper (for lack of space) is the possible relationship between long 
waves and the introduction of new energy sources and new energy conversion 
technologies, as suggested, e.g., by Volland (1987). Certainly, Figure 18 and Fig- 
ure 19 suggest that the first technological transformation was, to a large extent, 
about new ways to create and use energy: the substitution of coal for charcoal in 
iron making and the addition of steam power to waterpower as a prime mover. 
The second transformation was, in effect, the practical application of steam 
power to transportation and its diffusion throughout the manufacturing sector. 
In the case of the third transformation, the situation is more complex. A 
new primary source of energy appeared (petroleum), and this industry rapidly 
became one of the leading sectors. Moreover, the internal-combustion engine, a 
new type of prime mover arrived on the scene. Just as steam power plus iron 
provided the necessary conditions for the railroads, petroleum and the internal- 
combustion engine were two of the preconditions for automobiles. (Steel and 
sophisticated metal-working technology were the others.) Finally, electrification 
- perhaps the most far-reaching innovation of all - was fundamentally a new 
energy-conversion technology. In effect, steam power now reaches users in the 
form of electricity. 
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Figure 18. US energy, energy/GNP, and wholesale prices. (Source: N. Nakicenovic, 
IIASA, 1987.) 
In contrast, the fourth transformation had much less to do with energy per 
se and much more to do with mass production and mass consumption. Energy 
consumption per unit of GNP has been declining for most of this period, Figure 
20 - despite sharp increases in direct energy consumption by final consumers. 
To be sure, this period has also witnessed substitution for hydrocarbon liquids 
and gases for coal, reflecting the substitution of liquid fueled ICES for solid 
fueled steam engines in transportation and the substitution of gas and electricity 
for solid fuels in households. 
These substitutions, in turn, required a long period of transition because of 
the enormous infrastructures involved. Hundreds of thousands of miles of oil 
and gas pipeline had to be laid and hundreds of thousands of miles of highways 
had to be paved to facilitate the substitutions. During the phase of rapid 
buildup, a great deal of capital is required. There is anecdotal evidence, at least, 
that such infrastructures tend to be overbuilt in response to high returns on the 
earlier investment. As a result the return on the later phases of the investment 
are too low (or even negative). This has a depressing effect on subsequent 
economic growth, at  least until demand catches up. In some cases demand never 
does catch up, with the result that a great deal of capital is effectively devalued. 
This occurred in the UK canal system after 1840; as canals began to lose busi- 
ness to railways, canal stocks began a rapid decline. In addition, railway com- 
panies acquired sections of the canal system and made their use difficult and 
Figure 19. Sources of energy in the US. (Data taken from Schurr, Netschert et al.; U S  
BOC.) 
expensive (Taylor, 1942, p. 31). It is significant that this occurred before the 
major UK railway-building boom of 1845-1846. 
A similar situation occurred in the US railway system, which reached a 
peak of 429,883 miles of track in operation in 1930 (USBOC, 1975). This total 
declined continuously thereafter; the 1970 figure was 360,330 miles. The decline 
is a direct result of competition from federally subsidized highways, which grew 
from 169,007 miles in 1923 (the first year of available statistics) to 895,208 miles 
in 1970. It is noteworthy that road building accelerated during the 1930s, doubt- 
less to create jobs. However, some of the highway jobs "created" were certainly 
at the expense of railway jobs. 
At this stage the contribution of the overbuilding mechanism to an 
integrated theory of the long wave cannot be fully evaluated. It is one of several 
mechanisms considered by the systems dynamics group at  MIT (Forrester, 1976, 
1979, 1981; Sterman, 1983, 1985). In fact, the only definite conclusion it is 
25 t - EIGNP (including wood) + EIGNP (excluding wood) 
Year 
Figure Z0. The US energy/GNP ratio. (Sources: Schurr and Netschert, 1960; EIA, 
1986.) 
possible t o  reach at present is that technological change is a n  important deter- 
minant of the  long wave. Beyond that,  much more empirical historical research 
on technological change is needed before i t  would be safe t o  venture a 
comprehensive theory of the  long-wave phenomenon. 
Notes 
[I] I am indebted to Luc Soete for thia comment (Soete, 1988). I am not aware of any 
detailed study of the historical data with respect to thia iaeue. 
(21 The idea of the moving assembly line can be traced back to the mechanized 
"disassemblyn lines of the meat-packing industry in Cincinnati (1870s) and in 
principle to Oliver Evan's automatic flour mill of 1804 (Griedion, 1948, p. 86). 
131 That the market must be "sending a metwage" waa, of course, Holy Writ to moat 
bankers and financiers (and the academic economists who advised them). Some, 
such as Andrew Mellon, took the measage to be that speculative excess must be 
Upurgedm by a harsh doae of financial discipline and 'tight money." Some critics 
have charged that the Federal Reserve triggered the slump by reducing the money 
supply. For whatever reason, some 9,000 banks failed by 1933, with predictably 
adverse effects on d l  sectors of the economy. Others suggest that the evidence of 
federal actions points the other way, if anything (e.g., Temin, 1976). But other 
actions of the government may have contributed. For instance, the protectionist 
Smoot-Hawley Tariff (1930) added to a wave of retaliatory actions that sharply 
cut world trade. 
[4] The major sources for Section 5.1 are Jewkes et 01. (1961), Enos (1962), and Ency- 
clopedia Brittanica [Rubber, Sulfa Drugs (1955)l. 
[5] The major sourcea for Section 5.2 include Jewkea et al. [caae hiatories for radio, 
radar, and television (1961)], Finn (1967), Shiera (1969), and Lewia (1985). 
The major source for Section 5.3 waa Shurkin (1984). 
Actually punched paper rolla were f i s t  developed by Baaile Bouchon to control a 
draw-loom (used in the ailk-weaving induatry of Lyona) aa early aa 1725. Punched 
carda were introduced shortly thereafter by Falcon. An improved veraion of 
Bouchon'a loom waa built by Jacquea de Vaucanson (1741) but then neglected for 
half a century (in Paris' Mu& dea Arts et Metiers) until Joseph Marie Jacquard 
waa aaked to rebuild it in 1800. He made minor improvements, primarily revert- 
ing to Falcon's punched card acheme, and succeeafully commercialized it (Burke, 
1978). 
[8] In Germany, starting in the late 1930s Konrad Zuse also developed several elec- 
tromechanical computers with speeds comparable to Aiken's machine. The 2-4 
waa used to make aircraft design calculations in 1944. However, the German 
government withdrew support, and Zuee waa unable to reaume hia work until after 
the war. 
[9] Sourcea for Section 5.4 include Encyclopedia Brittanica (1955), Jewkea et al. (1961), and Wegener (1986). 
References 
Abernathy, William J., 1978, The Productivity Dilemma, Johns Hopkins University 
Press, Baltimore, MD. 
Ashton, T.S., 1949, Industrial Revolution, 1780-1890, Home Univeraity Library, London. 
Ayres, Robert U., 1984, The Nezt Industrial Revolution: Reviving Industry Through 
Innovation, Ballinger, Cambridge, MA. 
Ayres, Robert U., 1987, The Industry-Technology Life Cycle: An Integrating Meta- 
Model?, Reaearch Report (RR87-3), International Inatitute for Applied Syaterns 
Analysia, Laxenburg, Austria. 
Ayres, Robert U., 1988, Barriers and Breakthroughs: An Expanding Frontiera Model, 
Technovation 7(2): 87-116. 
Ayres, Robert U., 1989, US Competitiveness in Manufacturing, Management & Decision 
Economics, in press. 
Ayres, Robert U. and Miller, Steven M., 1983, Robotics: Applications & Social Implica- 
tions, Ballinger, Cambridge, MA. 
Bell, Daniel, 1976, The Coming Post-Indwtrial Society, Baaic Books, New York, NY. 
Bieahaar, H. and Kleinknecht, Alfred, 1983, Kondratieff Long Wavea in Aggregate Out- 
put? An Econometric Teat, Konjunkturpolitik 30 (5). 
Braudel, Fernand, 1981, Civilization and Capitalbm (15th-18th Century), English trans., 
3 Vole. Harper & Row, New York, NY. 
Briggs, h a ,  1963, Technology and Economic Development, Scientific American, S e p  
tember 1963, -99. 
Briggs, Aaa, 1982, The Power of Steam, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL. 
Burke, Jamea, 1978, Connections, Little Brown & Co., Boaton, MA. 
Clark, John, Freeman, Christopher, and Soete, Luc, 1983, Long Wavea, Inventiona, and 
Innovationa, in Christopher Freeman, ed., Long Waves in World Economic 
Development, Butterworth, London, UK. 
Crouch, Tom D., 1986, How the Bicycle Took Wing, American Heritage of Invention & 
Technology, Summer 1986,lO-16. 
Deane, Phyllis, 1979, The First Industrial Revolution, 2nd ed., Cambridge University 
Preas, Cambridge, UK. 
Dimitrov, Pave1 and Wandel, Sten, 1988, An International Analysis of Differences in 
Logistics Performance, Working Paper (WP-88-31), International Institute for 
Applied System Analysis, Laxenburg, Austria. 
Dosi, Giovanni, 1982, Technological Paradigms and Technological Trajectories, 
Research Policy, 11: 147ff. 
Elton, Arthur, 1958, Gas for Heat and Light, in C. Singer, E.J. Holmyard, A.R. Hill, 
and Trevor I. Williams, eds., The Indwtrial Revolution, A History of Technology, 
Vol. 4, Oxford University Presa, London, UK. 
Enos, J.L., 1962, Petroleum Progress and Profib: A History of Process Innovation, MIT 
Press, Cambridge, MA. 
Encyclopedia Brittanica, 1955 ed. 
Faber, Malte, ed., 1986, Studies in Awtrian Capital Theory, Investment, and Time, 
Springer Verlag, Heidelberg, FRG. 
Ferguson, Eugene, 1967, Metallurgical and Machine Tool Developments, in Melvin 
Kranzberg and Carroll W. Puraell, Jr., eds., Technology in Western Civilization 1, 
Oxford University Presa, New York, NY. 
Finn, Bernard S., 1967, Electronic Communications, in Melvin Kranzberg and Carroll 
W. Puraell, Jr., eda., Technology in Western Civilization 1, Oxford University 
Press, New York, NY. 
Forrester, Jay, 1976, Business Structure, Economic Cyclee, and National Policy, Futures 
8: 194-214. 
Forrester, Jay, 1979, An Alternative Approach to Economic Policy: Macrobehavior 
from Microstructure, in N. Kamreny and R. Day, eds., Economic Issues of the 
Eighties, Johns Hopkins University Presa, Baltimore, MD. 
Forreater, Jay, 1981, Innovation and Economic Change, Futures 13: 323-331. 
Freeman, Christopher, 1983, The Long Wave and the World Economy, Butterworth, 
Boston, MA. 
Garratt, G.R.M., 1958, Telegraphy, in C. Singer, E.J. Holmyard, A.R. Hill, and Trevor 
I. Williams, eds., The Industrial Revolution, A History of Technology, Vol. 4, 
Oxford University Presa, London, UK. 
Giedion, Siegfried, 1948, Mechanization Takes Command, W.W. Norton & Co., Inc., 
New York, NY. 
Hounshell, D., 1984, From the American System to Mass Production, 1800-1 933, Johns 
Hopkins University P m ,  Baltimore, MD and London, UK. 
Jewkes, John, Sawers, David, and Stillerman, Richard, 1961, The Sources of Invention, 
W.W. Norton & Co., Inc., New York, NY. 
Josephson, Matthew, 1959, The Invention of the Electric Light, Scientific American, 
November 1959. 
Kleinknecht, Alfred, 1981, Observations on the Schumpeterian Swarming of Innovations, 
Futures 13 (4). 
Kleinknecht, Alfred, 1984, Prosperity, Crisis, and Innovation Patterns, Cambridge Jour- 
nal of Economics 8: 251-270. 
Kleinknecht, Alfred, 1987, Innovation Patterns in Crisis and Prosperity: Schumpeter's 
Long Cycle Reconsidered, Macmillan, London, UK and St. Martin's Press, New 
York, NY. 
Kondratieff, N.D., 1926, Die langen Wellen der Konjunktur, Archiv fr'ir Sozialwissen- 
schaft und Sozialpolitik 56: 573. 
Kondratieff, N.D., 1928, Die Preisdynamik der industriellen und landwirtschaftlichen 
Waren, Archiv fur Son'a~wissenschaft und Son'alpolitik 60: 1. 
Kondratieff, N.D., 1978, Die Preiadynamik der industriellen und landwirtschaftlichen 
Waren, Engliah trans. of  1926 article, Review of Economics & Statistics 17: 105 f f ,  
Kuzneta, Simo, 1940, Schumpeter's Busineaa Cyclea, American Economic Review 30 
(June): 152 ff. 
Kuznets, Simon, 1953, Economic Change - Selected Essays in Business Cycles, National 
Income and Economic Growth, W.W. Norton & Co., Inc., New York, NY. 
Landes, David S., 1969, The Unbound Prometheus: Technological Change and Industrial 
Development in Western Europe from 1750 to the Present, Cambridge University 
Preaa, Cambridge, UK. 
Lewis, Thomas S.W., 1985, Radio Revolutionary, Invention and Technology, Vol. 1 (2) ,  
American Heritage Preae, New York, NY. 
MacRae, Norman, 1984, The 2024 Report: A Conciee Hietory of the Future 1974-2024, 
Sidgewick & Jackson Ltd., Landon, UK. 
Mandel, E., 1980, Long Waves of Capitalist Development: The Marzist Ezplanation, 
Cambridge University Preaa, Cambridge, UK. 
Mann, Julia de L., 1958, The Textile Induatry: Machinery for Cotton, Flax, Wool, 
1760-1850, in C. Singer, E.J. Holmyard, A.R. Hill, and Trevor I .  Williams, eds., 
The Industrial Revolution, A Hiatory of Technology, Vol. 4, Oxford University 
Press, London, UK. 
Mansfield, Edwin, 1983, Long Wavea and Technological Innovation, American Economic 
Review 7 3  (2): 141-145. 
Mensch, Gerhard, 1975, Das Technologieche Patt: Innovationen uberwinden die Depres- 
sion, Series: Stalemate in Technology: Innovations Overcome the Depression, 
Umachau, Frankfurt, FRG, English trans., Ballinger, Cambridge, MA, 1979. 
Nef, John U., 1954, in E.M. Carue-Wilson, ed., Essays in Economic Hietory, Edward 
Arnold, Landon, UK. 
Nelson, Richard R. and Winter, Sydney G., 1977, In Search o f  a Useful Theory of Inn* 
vation, Research Policy 6 (1). 
Passer, Harold C., 1953, Electrical Manufacturers 1875-1900, Harvard University Preae, 
Cambridge, MA. 
Perez-Perez, Carlotta, 1983, Towards a Comprehensive Theory of Long Wavea, in Bian- 
chi et al., eds., Long Waves, Depression & Innovation, Proceedings of Siena 
Conference. 
Perez-Perez, Carlotta, 1983, Towards a Compreheneive Theory of Long Waves, in Bian- 
chi et al., eda., Long Waves, Depression & Innovation, Proceedings of Siena 
Conference. 
Rostow, W.W., 1960, The Stages of Economic Growth, Cambridge University Press, 
New York, NY. 
Rostow, W.W., 1975, Kondratieff, Schumpeter, Kuznets: Trend Periods Revisited, 
Journal of Economic History 35. 
Rostow, W.W., 1978, The World Economy: Hietory and Prospect, University o f  Texas 
Preaa, Austin, T X .  
Sahal, Devendra, 1981, Patterns of Technological Innovation, Addison-Wesley, Reading, 
MA. 
Scherer, F .  Michael, 1984, Innovation and Growth, MIT Preae, Cambridge, MA. 
Schubert, H.R., 1958, Extraction and Production of Metals: Iron and Steel, in C.  
Singer, E.J. Holmyard, A.R. Hill, and Trevor I .  Will iam, eda., The Industrial 
Revolution, A History of Technology, Vol. 4, Oxford University Press, London, 
UK. 
Schumpeter, Joseph A., 1939, Business Cycles: A Theoreticd, Historical and Statistical 
Analysis ofthe CapitaCt Process, 2 Vols., McGraw-Hill, New York, NY. 
Schurr, Sam H., 1984, Energy Use, Technological Change and Productive Efficiency, in 
J.M. Hollander and Harvey Brooks, eda., Annud Review of Energy 9: 409-426. 
Schurr, S.H., Sonenblum, S., and Wood, D.O., eds., 1983, A Workshop on Energy, Pro- 
ductivity and Economic Growth, Oelgeschlager, Gunn & Hain, Electric Power 
Research Institute, Cambridge, MA. 
Schurr, Sam H. and Netschert, Bruce C., 1960, Energy in the American Economy, 
1850-1975, John Hopkins Univeraity Prese, Baltimore, MD. 
Sharlin, Harold I., From Faraday to the Dynamo, Scientific American, May 1963. 
Shiers, George, The First Electron Tube, Scientific American, March 1969. 
Shurkin, Joel, 1984, Engines of the Mind, W.W. Norton & Co., Inc., New York, NY. 
Smith, George David, 1985, The Anatomy of a Business Strategy, The Johns 
Hopkina/AT&T Series in Telephone History, Johna Hopkins University Press, Bal- 
timore, MD. 
Soete, Luc, personal communication, June 1988. 
Sterman, John, The Long Wave, Science 219, 18 March 1983. 
Sterman, John, An Integrated Theory of the Long Wave, Futures 17,  April 1985. 
Taylor, F. Sherwood, 1942, The Century of Science: 1840-1940, Readers Union Ltd. 
Series, Heinemann, London, UK. 
Temin, Peter, 1976, Did Monetary Forces Cause the Great Depression?, W.W. Norton & 
Co., Inc., New York, NY. 
Utterback, James M. and Abernathy, William J., 1979, A Dynamic Model of Process 
and Product Innovation, Omega 3. 
US Bureau of the Census, 1975, Historicd Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times 
to 1970, Bicentennial ed., USGPO, Washington, DC. 
Van Duijn, J.J., 1983, The Long Wave in Economic Life, George Allen & Unwin, Lon- 
don, UK. 
Van Gelderen, J., 1913, Springvloed: beechouwingen over industriele ontwikkeling en 
prijsbeweging, De Nieuwe Tijd 18 (4,5,6), cited in Kleindienat. 
Volland, Craig S., A Comprehenaive Theory of Long Wave Cyclea, Journal of Techno- 
logicd Forecasting & Social Change 32 (2), September 1987. 
Von Tunzelmann, G., 1978, Steam Power and British Industridization to 1860, Claren- 
don Preaa, Oxford, UK. 
Wegener, Peter, P., 1986, The Science of Flight, American Scientist 74: 268-278. 
Williamson, Harold F. and Daum, Arnold R., 1959, The American Petroleum Industry, 
Northwestern University Press, Evanaton, IL. 
About the Author 
Dr. Ayrea is Professor of Engineering and Public Policy a t  Carnegie Mellon University 
(Pittsburgh, PA) and Deputy Leader of the Technology, Economy and Society Program 
at  the International Institute for Applied Syatema Analyaia (IIASA), Laxenburg, Aus- 
tria. He is the author or coauthor of nine booka, 38 book chapters or symposium papera, 
and over 50 refereed journal articles, as well aa numerous technical reports on a variety 
of aubjecta. He haa been a 'futuriatn aa well aa a ayatema analyst. Hia current research 
is focused on technological change, with special emphaais on computer-integrated 
manufacturing and 'industrial metab~l is rn .~  

